Rystad on the future of offshore NW Europe…

Really good article and graph from Rystad Energy on the future of NW Europe and the size of reserves and output of the region but highlighting the challenges to production through a lack of exploration activity. It is very hard to disagree with this conclusion:

Northwest Europe, as one of the leading offshore regions globally and with OECD exposure, should therefore expect to see continued capital and resource allocation as along as the projects are competitive. Given the wide array of commercially very robust projects in the region, the expectations are towards a new development boom. However, poor exploration results over the last four years have not filled the project portfolio, potentially creating declining activity past 2020. [Emphasis added].

Rystad make a good point about resource availability and is something I have mentioned here under the #shalenarrative. E&P companies don’t always make capital allocation decisions on a strictly rational basis. The one area I think Rystad could help clarify (given their database) it looks intuitively to me like the bigger E&P companies are divesting smaller offshore areas in favour of larger projects. Statoil announced an increased stake in Roncador (Brazil) today and all the West of Shetland work is harsh environment/ high capex/high flow rate investments.

As an example Subsea 7/ Aker Solutions have won the Skogul tie-back to North Alvheim. These are large contracts, technically complex (pipe-in-pipe) with umbilicals, risers etc. Again it highlights to me that the project work that is going ahead favours larger contractors. In this case case the Aker BP/Aker solutions link was vital: but that is the point that all are large companies and Aker has been actively continuing exploratory and production drilling. It is the smaller E&P companies who have pulled this work back disproportionately.  Those who think there will be a linear increase in offshore work with a rise in the oil price I fear will be disappointed.

 

Subsea 7 and Conoco Phillips… industry bellwethers…

[N]othing can have value without being an object of utility.

Karl Marx

[I couldn’t agree more with the philosophy outlined in the Conoco Phillips graphic in the header].

A stark contrast in the fortunes of two companies reporting numbers yesterday and it doesn’t take a genius to work out that an E&P company (Conoco Phillips) is benefitting from a higher oil price while an offshore contractor (Subsea 7) is suffering from lower committed offshore spending. But I think it’s worth delving into a little deeper because the scale of the changes taking place in investment terms I think provide a note of guidance for how the future of the industry will look.

CP makes an excellent E&P company to use as an example. In 2015 CP announced they were giving up deepwater exploration but not deepwater production. All economic change occurs at the margin, the change in preferences of different actors in the economy melding into demand and supply curves which intersect at equilibrium points: in this case the decision to invest in deepwater production, or not, depending on market conditions. CP looks to be a hard task master in this regard: based on the statements and actions they have taken if CP decides to invest in offshore production others will as well.

I start with CP because E&P demand for offshore services is obviously crucial. Firstly, and this is not an original thought, the entire tone of this presentation (Q3 2017) is geared to financial returns to shareholders (you should actually read the whole thing to sense this) at the expense of production growth. Just as Shell, and other E&P companies have done, there is a signalling effect that this is a company that will not turn an oil price rise into a feast of mega-growth projects:

CP Priorities

The whole focus is being able to pay dividends even at a $40 per barrel price, gone are the 2013 days of boasting about reserve replacement ratios in excess of 170%. CP helpfully shows that this focus has helped them outperform their peer group: Executive level pay generally includes a link to performance against a defined peer group, if other E&P managers start losing bonuses by not being as disciplined on returning money to shareholders as CP, and their share price appreciation is less, their strategy will change extremely quickly. But in reality all the big companies reporting now are making “credible commitments” to return any excess cash to shareholders and focus on demand increases through short cycle production. Just as it would take years to turn investment decisions into projects now so much offshore engieering capability has been turned off, so too it will take a long time to change this investment narrative and performance incentive system in E&P companies that drive offshore demand. Any perceived linear link between an increase in the oil price and an increase in offshore demand is wrong in my view.

COP Works.png

Secondly: CapEx: for the 2018-2020 period CP is guiding sustaining CapEx at $3.5bn per annum and $2.0bn for expansion. Of the $2.0bn expansion $1.2bn is short-cycle unconventional and only $0.5bn for conventional/offshore and $0.3bn for exploration (split evenly between conventionals and short-cycle). To put that in context in 2012, when the offshore industry was going long on boats and rigs based on future demand, CP guided 2013 CapEx at USD $15.8bn! Of that 10% alone ($1.6bn) was for the North Sea and Alaska (i.e. offshore), 26% ($4.2bn) was for short-cycle, 15% ($2.4bn) for offshore Angola and GoM, and another 14% ($2.1bn).

Graphically it works like this: To keep production constant CP will spend $3.5bn

2018-2020 Flat Production.png

The green is entirely offshore. But to increase production:

COP Growth Production.png

The green in the second graph is almost all historic commitments. That is the future of offshore in a microcosm for the largest independent E&P company in the world and historically a major investor in deepwater offshore. The point is, for those bored of the minutiae, that CP have knocked ~$9.5bn off theirCapEx (60%) in 5 years (they have also divested assets so its not a straight relative comparison) and that the portion devoted to offshore is really related to legacy investments only now, not new fields or developments.

Third: productivity. I keep saying this but the productivity improvements look real to me the economist, as opposed to some of the geologists I know, who argue shale is bound fail:

CP Shale Productivity.png

The last line: >50% more wells per rig line! It’s all about productivity and scale and large companies investing in R&D are extracting more for less on a continuous basis from their shale wells. This is becoming a self-reinforcing cycle where they invest, improve, and re-invest. As I say here often: Spencer Dale is right.

This is the link point to Subsea 7, and all the other subsea contractors frankly. Subsea 7 have performed better than most other contractors throughout the downturn (not McDermott), but the issue is backlog and the pace of future work delivery: as CP seeks to please the stockmarket by avoiding all but the most promising of offshore investments (if any), SS7 and others must show huge declines in their order backlogs which de-risk a hugely expensive and specific asset base. I have said before I think you almost need to value subsea contracting companies like a bank: they fund long-term assets with a series of shorter duration contracts of uncertain redemption value, yes they have a much higher equity cushion, but they need it as they are borrowing short from a market to fund long term assets. Certainly smaller contractors are susceptible to “runs”.

In the last quarter SS7 had revenue of ~$1bn but it took in orders of only .5 of that (book-to-bill ratio) in new orders which left it with a backlog of $5.3bn (against liabilies of $2.4bn). At Q4 2013, when companies like CP were spending all their CapEx, SS7 had backlog of $11.8bn (against $3.8bn of liabilities).

Now SS7 is a well managed company and as can be seen they have reduced debt as the downturn continued, continued to return chartered tonnage,  and they have over $1.2bn in cash, so there are no problems in the short-term. But if you were owed money by SS7 I would rather be owed a higher amount backed by nearly 3x backlog than owed a smaller amount by 2x (a declining) backlog. The problem is the pace at which all the contracting companies are eating through their backlog of contracted work that was at a significantly higher margin than the work they are bidding for now. The actual booked backlog number is the only certainty guiding real expectations of future profitability.

It is a function of the SS7 business model that they have an extremely long position in very specialist assets that sap meaningful amounts of money from companies if they are not working as the graph from the FMC Technip results makes clear:

Technip margin erosion.png

The single largest fact in Technip’s declining subsea margin is lower fleet utilization. If Technip and SS7 are expecting poor utilization in 2018 then it is locked in for the rest of the supply chain.

The fact is the huge offshore CapEx pull back and reallocation by the E&P companies is continuing unabated. Offshore allocations may not be declining in real terms any more but E&P companies are making clear to their shareholders that it isn’t going to materially increase either. The offshore fleet built for 2014 isn’t getting a reprieve from the Oil Price Fairy, the gift from that fairytale should it come true for the E&P companies will be given to shareholders, who after the volatility they have suffered in recent years feel they are owed higher risk weighted returns. E&P companies are locking in systems and processes that ensure their procurement in the supply chain will systematically lower their per unit production costs for years to come and ensuring that other asset owners get lower returns for their investments is a core part of that.

And it’s not only backlog the SURF business now is declining year-on-year of you look at the Q3 2017 SS7 results:

Q3 2017 BU performance.png

~$50m is a meaningful decline in revenue (6.3%) for SURF alone and the decline in i-tech shows that the maintenance market hasn’t come back either. Both CapEx and OpEx work remain under huge margin pressure and in the maintenance market the smaller ROV companies with vessel alliances are all mutually killing any chance of anyone making money until a significant amount of capacity leaves the market. The point of reinforcing this is that it is clear that the E&P companies do not view higher prices the start of a relaxation of cost controls: this is the new environment for offshore contractors.

Subsea maintenance costs involving vessels are time and capital intensive. Internally E&P companies are weighing up whether to invest in maintenance CapEx for offshore assets or new CapEx on short cycle wells. At the margin many like CP are choosing short cycle over offshore and hence the demand curve for offshore is likely to have shifted permanently down and price alone is simply not clearing the market.

I have only used SS7 as they are the purest subsea player in the market. I definitely think it is one of the better managed companies in the industry buut it is impossible to fight industry effects this big when demand is falling, and therefore the size of the market is shrinking, and you have such a high fixed cost base. Not everyone can take market share.

SS7 will be a survivor, and longer term given the technical skills and scale required to compete in this industry I think it likely in the long run they will earn economic profits i.e. profits in excess of their cost of capital, along with the larger SURF contractors excluding Saipem. But they will do this by being brutal with the rest of the supply chain that has gone long on assets and simply doesn’t have the operational capability and balance sheet to dictate similar terms. For everyone below tier one the winter chill is just beginning.

So what does this point to for the future of the industry?

  1. It is a safe bet with all the major E&P companies CapEx locked in for 2018 now and all the OpEx budgets done that demand isn’t going to be materially different from 2017. Slightly higher oil prices may lead to some minor increases in maintenance budgets but nothing that will structurally affect the market
  2. A smaller number of larger offshore projects of disproportionate size and importance fot the larger contractors and industry. Only the largest will have the technical skills and capability to deliver these (hence SS7 ordering a new pipelay vessel). These projects will have higher flow volume and lower lift costs and will be used by E&P majors to underpin base demand
  3. A huge bifurcation in contractor profitability between those capable of delivering projects above and the rest of the industry who will struggle to cover their cost of capital for years
  4. An ROV market that uses surplus vessels and excess equipment equipment that keeps margins at around OpEx for years as vessel owners seek this option for any utilisation
  5. E&P companies consistently seeking to standardise shale production, treat it as a manufacturing process that drives down per unit costs, and increase productivity. Any major offshore CapEx decision will be weighed against the production flexibility of shale
  6. Structurally lower margins in any reocvery cycle for the majority of SURF contractors

GE and Subsea 7 …

The past few decades of leadership at GE has lessons for all companies. Stay focused on areas where you have differentiated skills (engineering, for GE) and avoid trends (financialisation). Set short-term expectations you can hit, but manage for the long-term. Take hard decisions. And hope for a little bit of good luck.

FT View, 21 October, 2017

There is a really easy explanation for why the BHGE and Subsea 7 talks broke off (aside from the fact that Kristian Siem probably likes owning and actively running a company with as many cool toys as Subsea 7)… Have a look at these results from BHGE last week:

BHGE 3Q 2017 Oil

BHGE basically turned over $3.4bn in oil field services and equipment and made no money on it (a 1% operating margin). Subsea 7 on the other hand has been a profit machine through the down turn:

SS7 5 year share price

Subsea 7 might be a much smaller company but it had operating income of $235m on $1bn of revenue. The only real worry Subsea 7 has is the size of the order book and Brazil exposure.  Subsea 7 really doesn’t need to expose it’s shareholders to the risks of a complex merger integration that isn’t going as quite as planned: Some commentary indicated the market was worse than when the merger was announced, not something anyone in the market I think really believes.  On those numbers Subsea 7 management would be taking over BHGE not the other way around.

The fact is that that the top end subsea execution companies have found a profitable niche. The OpEx is so high that competitors just didn’t last as the downturn hit, projects bid at the peak of the market got procurement at the bottom, a kind of natural hedge,  whereas the markets BHGE competes in might be bigger but they are structurally less profitable because more people can compete in them and the lower OpEx commitment means they just keep on doing so.

I still think the backlog is a huge issue. Financial markets are notoriously short-sighted and fickle, and I cannot see how the vast drop in demand in seismic and rig utilisation doesn’t eventually lead into dramatically lower offshore commitments. But I also accept that offshore oil isn’t going anywhere fast and it would appear Subsea 7, FMC Technip and a couple of others are pulling away. Saipem came out with some horrible numbers today with adjusted EBITDA in the offshore division down 17% YOY showing there is still pain to come. And everyone complains of weak order intake… But the larger companies appear to be generating more than sufficient cash to see off the weak and be in a great position for even a mild recovery.

I’m naturally scpetical that you can simply pick markets and keep acquiring companies on a “buy and build” strategy and this contrasts strongly with the very clear industrial strategy Subsea 7 has followed for a long time now. Exactly as the FT recommends GE should do whereas BHGE seems to be the combination of two companies facing ex ante growth limits who looked for a transaction to try and solve structural issues. Eventually you can probably cut enough cost to force it to work in a financial sense but industrial logic takes years to develop.

One thing is for sure: If BHGE are serious about getting involved in offshore execution only McDermott is big enough to move the financial needle and small enough to digest in a practical sense.

Backlog, boats, and oligopolies…

“[E]conomists usually assume that people know how the economy works. This is a bit strange since economists don’t even know how the economy works”. …

Xavier Gabaix

There was a lot of talk about Subsea 7 ordering a new pipelay vessel last week, and given the engineering quality at Subsea 7 I am sure it will be an efficient, if not technically brilliant, asset. I don’t have a counter-opinion on this: Subsea 7 shareholders expect them to be a market leader and this means buying assets, particularly when yard prices are likely to be advantageous.  The plan would seem to try and push the technical window of pipelay even further and make it harder for smaller tier two contractors to offer a competitive product with such technical features as heated pipe-in-pipe.

As a replacement for the erstwhile Navica it will ensure a leading edge capability. The Navica was built in 1999 so Subsea 7 had 16 good years out of her and  for a number of years Technip and Subsea 7 offered the only realistic reel lay in the North Sea, and I would say the vessel made real money for the shareholders from 2004 onwards (especially when considering the huge number of DSV days she generated) until 2014. Subsea 7 depreciates vessels between 10-25 years and I wonder what the figure is for pipelay assets?  If the pace of innovation in the pipe technology is such that you need a new vessel as a platform every few years then the economics would dictate a slow diffusion of pipe technology (I don’t think it’s likely).

At USD~300m it is not a massive purchase for Subsea 7 either. In 2017, in the midst of the worst industry crisis ever, Subsea 7 made a special dividend of USD 191m, and this vessel is 3 years away from the take-out payment (and could probably be pushed back if needed). The interesting thing is given the delivery time how Subsea 7 see the market coming back… because its not in the backlog. In 2013 Subsea 7 published their backlog as USD 11.8bn:

Subsea 7 Backlog Q4 13

Strangely, for the last few quarters the bar graph has been dropped in favour of the pie graph and the number is materially smaller:

Subsea 7 Backlog June 2017.png

That USD 4.4bn also includes ~USD 1.4bn for the PLSVs in Brazil. Now to be fair when Subsea 7 had backlog of USD 11bn it had six vessels under construction and was targeting CapEx of ~USD 1bn, 60% on new builds and 25% on replacement CapEx. As the order book at Subsea 7 has dropped so has CapEx pretty much proportionately. It is also interesting that they can cut maintenance CapEx back so much with guidance for total CapEx this year guided in at USD 180-220m. Yes, it’s a lot less than Depreciation, but as the industry contracts this is going to become more normal, the asset base has to shrink to reflect the total macro demand.

However, I think you can get a sense of Subsea 7 managements’ confidence in the future from this graph in their 2016 annual report:

Subsea 7 Outlook Feb 17

2014-2018 look like lean years with the tap opening up in 2018. The sceptic in me always looks at the variability of the grey box (USD/bbl 40-60) and thinks the longer market sentiment remains negative the less likely this segment is likely to fulfill its potential, because the baseload of offshore projects at USD 40 is depressingly small. But if Subsea 7 shareholders expect their company to be a market leader, and if the market is moving to longer tie-ins with heated pipe, then that is the direction the company must go. What is interesting, and will be impossible to tell for outsiders initially, is how they price this in the market? If they only have 10 years to get a return on the investment the project day rate will have to be substantially higher than if it’s a 20 year investment.

You can make a bear case for Subsea 7 being too long on pipelay capacity in Brazil and for it going too early with this vessel if the recovery doesn’t come, otherwise they have arguably handled and read the downturn better than anyone. But I guess what the management really don’t want is a company that doesn’t have the asset base if the market comes back and this is only balanced against the very high cost base vessels have if they don’t work.  Again in the latest SS7 presentation they showed this market data which would give the Management/Board the confidence to invest:

Subsea market outlook Sep 2017

Subsea 7 have the liquidity to make it through to a forecast upturn and other shareholders will have the confidence they are following on the back of Siem Industries,  who have been remarkably honest about the problems they face at Siem Offshore and their commodity tonnage.

I think it likely that at the top end of SURF FMC Technip, Saipem, Subsea 7 and McDermott pull away from the other companies and create a small pool of competitors who bid for projects offshore globally that only they can realistically do given the technical sophitication and asset base required for delivery. A large number of the tier two installation contractors are no more (Swiber, EMAS Chiyoda, SeaTrucks), so the bigger contractors should gain market share on some of the more basic installations and offer a host of technical capabilities that will make it impossible for smaller companies to compete on the larger projects.

Therefore the question is whether a small number of firms bid each other out of profits or whether they create economic value? I think you can make a bull case for Subsea 7, and the other large integrated SURF contractors, based on theories of market power and argue that this is a case where if they can push the technical and asset window enough they will generate significant economic profits, and this vessel order needs to be seen in that light. This isn’t true for every segment in the subsea market and is unique to the financial strength and product breadth the large integrated contractors have.

Markets with a small number of selling firms who are in a strong position are known as oligopolies. These market structures have fascinated economists for years because of the potential for collusion and price setting (as well as the failure of the firm profits to decline over time as classical theory would suggest). But two theories, based on French mathemeticians (who looked at a spring water duopoly) allow some insight into how the SURF companies will behave in the future: Bertrand competition, which argues that companies in this position would sell on price; or Cournot competition, which argues that companies in this position maximise sales and ultimately profitability.

In a much longer post (for another day and likely of limited interest) I will argue that this likely oligopoly of large SURF contractors will compete on a Cournot model, and therefore these firms are likely to make significant economic profits, despite the capital intensity of the industry. Cournot models are defined by:

  • [M]ore than one firm and all firms produce a homogeneous product, i.e. there is no product differentiation;
  • Firms do not cooperate, i.e. there is no collusion;
  • Firms have market power, i.e. each firm’s output decision affects the good’s price;
  • The number of firms is fixed;
  • Firms compete in quantities, and choose quantities simultaneously;
  • The firms are economically rational and act strategically, usually seeking to maximize profit given their competitors’ decisions.

The high-end SURF market is a clear case of this: a relatively small number of firms (n=4 maybe n=7 in some cases) and specialised asset base, well known to competitors and easily monitored, allows firms to understand well what there rivals are doing. For game theorists it is a market made in heaven where the signalling intentions of all parties are obvious. From an E&P perspective, when you cut through the enginering voodoo language, the product is homogenous: it takes oil from a well to a transfer point. Firms will not irrationally bid down project margins constantly as they are aware of the competitive effect of doing this (which is different from when EMAS Chiyoda and other pretenders were in existence), and in reality the high-end SURF firms are well aware what projects suit their asset base and are “must win” projects. The network of alliances, and integrated solutions from the seabed, cannot be easily replicated but are not so different in technical terms that competitors cannot make intelligent judgements about a competitors cost base.

Each firms output decision will affect price because the large step increase in investment required for new capacity will make these companies more cautious is a more depressed market. The quantity theory of output is likely the least intuitive part of the theory for subsea but in essence firms will limit the supply of new vessels and concentrate on utilisation. The big four SURF contractors will only add vessel capacity when it generates profits well above capital costs – which simply hasn’t been true in the past. Over time as the new build wave subsides the firms will choose to limit the supply and focus on cash which will drive up rates (above marginal cost). This is different from a bank enforced asset freeze I have mentioned before as these companies are large enough to access asset funding.

For the tier 2 companies and vessel owners below my depressing tone of poor margins and over capacity will continue for some time I guess. But technical innovation and high CapEx, with mildly increasing demand, should allow the top SURF contractors to exercise a degree of non-collusive pricing power that will generate real economic profits in the not too distant future. These firms will take market share in the more commoditised (and shallow) field development market and face limited competition for high-end field development work which is a growing segment of the market (hence Subsea 7’s move into the Gulf of Mexico in a big way with the EMASC assets).

So despite a generally depressed industry it is easy to imagine the high-end SURF firms prospering to a certain extent. Brazil is the country however that hangs over Subsea 7 and to a lesser extent FMC Technip (and I wonder if it really sank the DOF Subsea IPO): too much flexlay capacity. It’s very hard to see how much capacity Petrobras is going to give back, but a look at tree awards suggests a degree of discomfort for the vessel owners.With one dominant customer the downside is clearly and intense period of price competition between FMC Technip and Subsea 7 in Brazil to keep their assets working. This is a classic example of Betrand competition where two firms who offer an identical product, and cannot collude, find the buyer chooses everything from the firm with the lowest price. Such a statement seems vaguely tautological but in economic terms it is more about a formal proof that two firms can push industry margins down to zero economic profits as efficiently as a large number of firms competing.

Note: For Saipem I am talking SURF only. At a corporate level I don’t see any respite for them).

(P.S. The header pictire is of a “Kinked” demand curve which is core to the oligopoly model.)

 

 

Backlog is essential for re-financing…

“Just because you don’t understand it doesn’t mean it isn’t so.”
― Lemony SnicketThe Blank Book

The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.

— Adam Smith (1776)

Subsea 7 purchased the remnants of EMAS Chiyoda last week in a tale that highlights how not getting your timing right can be an expensive mistake in subsea. Chiyoda have probably decided to stick to stuff they know something about this time.

Contrary to my earlier remarks I think the Subsea 7 is an okay defensive deal. The Gulf of Mexico is a growth deepwater market (one of the few) and the weakest one for Subsea 7, and in addition they bolster their position in the Middle East. Backlog for Subsea 7 was virtually static in the last quarter which highlights why they need to take such aggressive steps to prop it up, the downside is they have added to their fixed cost base at a time of declining demand and project margins. There is an outside risk as I have said before that the backlog was poorly tendered and there are integration risks associated with the delivery, but Subsea 7 is one of the world’s best engineering companies and probably consider this manageable.

But it was backlog that drove this more than any other consideration I would argue…

Another deal, Project Astra, is kicking around the distressed debt houses at the moment and this is a deal that comes with pipeline more than backlog: the refinancing of Bibby Offshore.  I think Bibby have left it extremely late to raise capital like this in what is actually a pretty complicated transaction. If executed as planned it will involve a substantial writedown of debt by the bondholders in addition to a liquidity issue. The real question is surely why an interest payment was made on June 15 almost simultaneously along with an IM seeking capital? Surely a business in control of this wouldn’t be paying bondholders interest while trying to organise a liquidity issue?

The answer is that far from Bibby Line Group (“BLG”) being a supportive shareholder they are actually the major problem here as this process starts the recognition that their equity value in Bibby Offshore Holdings Limited is worthless. BLG had every reason to try and believe, against all the available evidence in the market, that this was going to be a quiet year. After losing £52m at operating profit in 2016, having no visible backlog, and clearly no firm commitments for work, they instead sanctioned the Bibby Offshore ploughing forward into what is effectively a financial catastrophe. The BLG Portfolio Director is a chartered accountant and frankly should have known better: management wrapped up in the situation cannot pretend to be objective but that is what a Board, and financially literate Chairman, is for.

Instead, and clearly given the asymmetric nature of the payoff to BLG as shareholders, they sanctioned what can only best be described as bizarre financial decisions, all driven to try and protect the BLG shareholders against the interest of the creditors, which frankly from Sep/Oct 16 should have been the primary concern of the Directors. However, they are only human and when their employer is the shareholder it has placed the majority of the Executive Board in an invidious and conflicted situation.

Unless you are a full EPIC contractor subsea contracting is essentially a regional business and to justify the head-office an integration costs you need to add significant scale and value in the regions you are in. Bibby Offshore HQ offers none of this and new investors participating are merely prolonging this charade, like the Nor Offshore liquidity investors they will be buying something the literally do not understand.

In addition to the obvious and valid questions as to the structural market characteristics Bibby Offshore is involved in Bondholders, now presented with what is in effect an emergency liquidity issue or administration, must be wondering inter alia:

  • Why the ex-COO has been sent on an ex-pat package to Houston to build-up the business when they are facing an imminent liquidity crisis? (Fully loaded this must be close to USD 500k per annum including house, airfares etc? Madness).
  • Why they should pump liquidity into a North American operation that has no competitive advantage, no backlog, and having had the best DSV in the GoM this year has managed to win less than 40 days work?
  • Why the BOHL is holding the value of the DSVs on the balance sheet at over GBP 100m when it is clear that their fair value is worth considerably less? It would be interesting to see the disclaimers brokers have provided for this valuation because should the capital raised be insufficient to carry BOHL though to profitability the delta between those values and realised values are likely to be very sore points of contention by those who put money in this. The Nor Offshore and Vard vessels provide ample proof that these assets are effectively unsellable in the current market and if the have to sold down in Asia/Africa/GOM those two DSVs would be lucky to get USD 25m and substantially less for a quick sale
  • Why there is a Director of Innovation and Small Pools Initiative when the core UK diving business is going backwards massively in cash flow terms? Why in fact are there 3 separate Boards for such a small company? Has legal structure been confused with operational structure?
  • Why the CEO’s wife is running a “Business Excellence” Department when the overhead is well over GBP 20m per annum? It might sound like a minor deal but as the lay-offs have increased it has clearly become a huge issue for staff working inside the business and it is like a cancer on morale

These extra costs are in the millions a year and add to the air of unreality of the whole proposal.

DeepOcean was another company with a lot of IRM type work but managed a successful refinancing. Management and staff all took a pay cut and built up a huge backlog in renewables and IRM work prior to seeking a refinancing. Potential investors there face execution risk on project delivery but can model with some certainty the top-line. The same just isn’t true at Bibby although the cost base can be shown with a  great deal of accuracy and there management have taken no pay cuts and the cost cutting doesn’t seem to have reflected the seriousness of the downturn.

No one should blame the management but rather a supine and ineffective Board that have allowed this situation to develop. None of the potential investors I have spoken to look like putting money in. It makes much more sense to try and “pre-pack” the business from administration than go through the complexity of a renegotiating with the bondholders and getting a byzantine capital structure in place in which they do not share all of the upside.

The reason all these issues collide of course is a classic agent-principal conflict: In a market where activity has declined so markedly to raise money to invest in developing new markets is verging on the absurd. Bibby Offshore is losing money in Norway and the US, has a minor ROV operation in Singapore which is unprofitable most of the time, and has seen a significant decline in the core UK diving business. The logical strategy is therefore to strip it back to basics, but that means the people negotiating the fundraising would be out of a job and therefore the strategy they have devised, not surprisingly, is more of the same and hope the market turns. This has suited the shareholder for the reasons outlined above.

Like so many companies grappling with The New Offshore Bibby is a very different company to the one that raised cash in 2014. Back then there were 4 North Sea class DSVs all working at very high rates in addition to the CSVs (and two DSVs were chartered adding extra leverage). Now not even 2 DSVs are close to break-even utilisation and the CSV time charter costs are well above any expected revenue. Returning the Olympic CSVs will cut the cash burn but merely reinforces the fact that the business no longer has an asset base that offers any realistic prospect of the bondholders being made whole (the drop in the bond price in the last few weeks confirming they now realise this).

It is in-short a mess, and one the BLG Portfolio Director and NED more than others should be placing their hand in the air to take responsibility for. It was obvious when the £52m operating loss was announced that a restructuring was needed, particularly in light of what was happening in Norway, and leaving it this late to raise funds. To pretend a fundamental structural change is not required, is simply irresponsible.

I had five years at Bibby Offshore, 4 of those were the most rewarding of my professional career to date. It gives me no pleasure to write this but I can’t help feeling the path that has been taken here risks seeing people not getting paid one month while on the BLG website will be a big article about how they sponsored a mountain walk to Kenya and highlighting their credentials as a good corporate citizen. But it is also true by the end I did have an issue with the strategy, which when you are notionally in charge of it becomes a big issue. The company shareholders insisted on a 50% of net profit dividend strategy, which in a capital-intensive industry when you were growing that quickly meant there was constant working capital pressure yet alone expansion capital. Yet every year at the strategy planning meetings we were expected to present ambitious growth plans where capital was no object, except it always was. Over the years the farce built up that when multiplied by easy credit has not worked out well. What this translated to at the Bibby Offshore level was a management team who wanted to build another Technip without anything like the resources needed to realistically accomplish this.

I used to constantly try and explain the benefits of “plain vanilla equity” but it was simply not what the shareholders wanted and it was clear at Group that they were already concerned about the size of Bibby Offshore in relation to the overall holding company. This culture of unrealistic planning has formed the basis of which constantly missing numbers hasn’t sent the right warning signal to the Board about the scale of the impending losses in the business despite it being blatantly obvious to ex-employees.

What the BLG shareholders wanted was to do everything on borrowed money, which is fine if it’s your business. But this attitude led to the Olympic charters and fatefully the bond, which in itself was a dividend recap taking GBP 37m out, and it of course left the business woefully undercapitalised in all but the best of conditions.

Bibby Offshore as a company would have had the best chance of surviving this downturn if it had approached the bondholders early about the scale of the problem, stopped making interest payments and saving the cash, had a meaningful contribution from the shareholders at a place in the capital structure that was risk capital, and approached Olympic about massively reducing the charter rates while extending the period of commitment (this would have been complex but the banks were realising 2 years ago they needed deals like this as Deepsea Supply showed). These are the hallmarks of all the successful restructurings that have been done. Instead for the benefit of the shareholders they took a massive gamble that the market would comeback and had a spreadsheet showing it was theoretically possible in the face of common sense. The consequences of this are now coming home.

Bondholders of course only have themselves to blame, The Bibby bond was a covenant light issue and was essentially bullet redemption on depreciating fixed assets, a risk all financial investors know deep down is just gambling. Confident in the mistaken view that BLG would step in the bonds have held up unnaturally in pricing for an eon while the company continued to burn through cash at a rate that should have worried any serious investor. They have now been presented with a nuclear scenario where they must put something in or face potentially nearly a total write-off of their investment, a quick look at the Nor bonds and asset situation only strengthening Bibby’s hand.

London is awash with distress credit investors at the moment who are long on funds. Many are traders and hopeful of entering a position with a quick exit to someone else, and they may get this deal away with people like this. But it is a very hard sell because unlike DeepOcean there is no backlog only pipeline, and one is bankable and the other is not.

 

How much is the Lewek Constellation worth? Somewhere between USD 43m and USD 370m (I’m closer to the former)…

“His services are like so many white elephants, of which nobody can make use, and yet that drain one’s gratitude, if indeed one does not feel bankrupt.”

G. E. Jewbury’s Letters, 1892

The EMAS Chiyoda restructuring plan nears execution. The most interesting aspect to me is what the Lewek Constellation is valued at and how the banks get this problem off their hands (i.e. how much of a loss do they have to take?) Outside of Saipem, SS7, Technip, McDermott, and Heerema (maybe) it is very hard to see who the realistic buyers would be? There is no spot market for these assets because you need a huge engineering capability (and cost base) on the beach to run one of these assets. And the real problem is that all these potential buyers have added substantial new tonnage in deepwater pipelay very recently. (My previous thoughts on asset specificity and transaction costs are here). Without a dramatic improvement in the market it’s hard to see why anyone would want this asset?

Or not? In the Chapter 11 reorg Subsea 7 and Chiyoda are essentially providing a USD 90m Debtor-In-Possession  facility that sees them take over 5 EMAS Chiyoda entities emerge that have 15 projects with c.1bn in backlog. Subsea 7 obviously decided this was the easiest way to get the work, and when you drop c.USD 1bn in backlog in a year it’s easy to see why you want to be inventive. The big SURF scopes are Cape Three Points and Chevron Tahiti Vertical Expansion. Given how far the engineering had advanced and the fact the contracts had been awarded it is easy to see why Subsea 7 would want to take some risk getting this work.

Some context: back in 2013, the build year of the Lewek Constellation, Clarkson published this graph:

Clarkson Subsea Trees Nov 25 2013

Now Clarkson’s are no different to anyone. I could have picked any number of information providers, the commonly held view was only how much growth there would be, and how much kit you needed to access it. Shale was not in vogue and starting it’s extraordinary journey.  Although as an aside, because I don’t want to delve into shale productivity here (but you can read some of my thoughts here and here), the US rig count was higher than it currently is.  But the point is clearly that boards, managers, and financing institutions all thought the market would evolve something like that graph. On such a basis the investment decision was made for the Lewek Constellation and DNB and a syndicate of banks advanced USD 503m in two facilities and got two Panamian mortgages and a credit agreement in return. Of that USD 370m in capital is outstanding under facuility A (and the 100m from facility B is effectively written off) in the Chap 11.

The market has obviously changed somewhat:

Subsea Tree Awards 2000-2019e

The single best indicator of future demand for heavy installation vessels is subsea tree awards. Now it is clear that demand has dropped and will remain depressed for a long time at around 2003/2004 levels. Strip out Brazil, where Petrobras has extensive spare PLSV capacity for flexlay, and you are within a margin of error of 2003 numbers. Yes, more proportionately will be in deep water, but the subsea lay fleet was built for 2013/14 not 2003 and no amount of deferred consideration can change that.

Let’s be clear the Lewek Constellation is a capable vessel, but I wrote here about competition: a significant number of competing vessels have been built in recent years and this is all about competition at the margin. These types of vessels don’t work to their maximum potential every day, they work on a broad range of smaller jobs and then make real money on a couple of jobs of a year where the competition is less and pricing is based not only on vessel capability but about engineering value added by the contractor. None of them is differentiated enough to win a project in its own right.

So a market transaction has been reached whereby Newco (owned by Subsea 7) will charter the vessel for USD 4.3m per annum and the cost of the dry dock (c. 2018) is split 50/50 at ~USD 5m each. That is, in the current environment Subsea 7/Newco judges that it is economic to add marginal (extra) lay capacity at bareboat rate per year of USD 4.3m, plus drydock accrual and operating expenses,  and the bank/owner has agreed it is economic to charter their asset at this rate. That is a market-based economic transaction between a “willing-buyer/ willing-seller” for the capital value of the asset and it reflects some backlog that a qualified purchaser can deliver with it. Subsea 7/Newco has an option to purchase the asset for USD 370m during the first 2 years of the charter agreement and this is then used a “floor” going forward or broker valuations less USD 20m. The extension options rise dramatically (see below).

Now if you add 3% per annum to the charter rate, add in dry dock costs, assume 10m salvage value in 20 years, and discount this back by the DNB WACC (10.4% today) you get an implied vessel value of ~ USD 43m.  I would argue that is a fair value for the vessel, which is pretty much in line with the discount MDR paid for the Amazon and NPCC paid for Atlantis (I mentioned this yesterday).  [I used the 3% growth in the annual day rate to reflect an industry with excess capacity and therefore growth roughly inline or above a CPI measure, obviously the mortgage banks would regard this number as unacceptably low. However, I think the discount rate at DNB WACC (rather than funding costs or liquidity spreads perhaps) given the project risk is far too low. Obviously different inputs will lead to different results.] For the sake of a comparison in order to get the vessel value to anything like USD 370m you have to increase the charter rate 25% per annum for the entire assumed 20 year period! The charter rate is also linked to a LIBOR adjustment, something that is very rare, and highlights how senstive the banks are to a valuation projection here.

This purchase option number strikes me as a fantasy and reflects the fact that DNB recorded a capital value of USD 370m outstanding in the Chap 11 filing. If you look at the forward order book for subsea trees or announced projects in three years, and all the excess capacity on the vessels, who really believes Subsea 7 is going to pay USD 60 000 per day in 4 years time (USD 21.9m per annum) rising to USD 80 000 per day (USD 29m per annum) in 5 years time? You might do under the assumptions in the first graph but not in the second. It is a chimera to help the banks out and allow everyone to play for time. The initial charter rate implies a 1.16% interest rate on the capital outstanding, so DNB don’t really believe the USD 370m figure, but it highlights the size of the economic subsidy required now for everyone to pretend they haven’t lost as much money as they say.

I was a big fan of Subsea 7 just handing the asset back and forcing the banks into a lengthy period of nervousness and reality, but it would have meant Subsea having to tender for the work. I believe that the Lewek Constellation is such a specific asset that it is actually effectively valueless in the current market. The best thing for the industry was for the asset to fade into obscurity; in this market, and after Ceona, no one would risk a start-up and few other companies would have agreed to help DNB. Clearly Subsea 7 have a strong cash and liquidity position, need the work, and this gives them an option if the market really did take off again. However, surely the most likely scenario from the banks point-of-view, under any objective reading of the market, is that in two years Subsea 7 come back and tell them to start getting real about the price and the asset value? There is a very Norwegian behind the scenes solution going on here with DNB obviously desperate not to have to recognise the vessel at a fire sale price now, or expose itself to the OpEx, and in all likelihood was involved in soliciting Subsea 7 as part of the financing shop around discussed in the documents.

If the Bibby bondholders are looking at these transactions closely they must be getting nervous now. With the bonds trading in the mid-60s the implied valuation of the Polaris and Sapphire is c.GBP 105m, a number that looks as egregious as the USD 370m purchase option for the Lewek Constellation.

The big risk for Subsea 7 isn’t the committed expenditure, which amounts to USD 4.3m for charter per annum (+ the undefined LIBOR spread), + vessel OpEx (probably the same), and c. USD 5m for the dry-dock, it is that they appear to have agreed to deliver the EMAS Chiyoda contracts for the same lump sum price and contractual terms. The few projects EMAS Chiyoda delivered were a disaster in engineering terms, and that isn’t just Angostura, I have spoken to people who have managed other jobs with them. If Subsea 7 haven’t had enough time to due diligence the project engineering and costing properly, which is notoriously hard in lump sum jobs, they are going to have a big problem. Although the contracts appear to be novated to Newco, who exposure in one set of documents appears capped at USD 90m (that may be a placeholder), such a situation is likely to involve other Subsea 7 tonnage and exposure through the supply chain. Subsea 7 are one of the world’s great engineering houses but in 2013 a painful conference call to discuss Guara Lula (which they had bid themselves) led to these comments:

[w]e moved into the offshore phase of the project in the second quarter, with the Seven Polaris and the Seven Oceans being deployed on location. We are experiencing more weather downtime than originally planned due to severe weather conditions in the Santos Basin during the Brazilian winter. We have suffered equipment damage and the resulting downtime on the Polaris due to this bad weather. We expect these conditions to continue until the season is over. Although we are contractually covered for time spent by the prime vessel waiting on weather, we incur additional costs, both offshore and onshore, which are not covered. In addition, we have taken a more cautious approach in evaluating what can be achieved offshore during periods of calm weather, in view of the complexity of the facts involved…

Second, the stretched supply chain is resulting in delays from international and local suppliers….

[t]here was a delayed start to pipeline fabrication at the Ubu spool-base largely due to customs clearance issues. Initial productivity at Ubu has also taken longer to ramp up than expected…

A re-evaluation of the offshore risks based on experience to date, and the extended timeline of the project, has resulted in us increasing the estimate full-life project loss by between $250 and $300 million.

Final losses were USD 355m and that was on vessels and a project they tendered internally. Subsea 7 don’t know this vessel at all, and the engineers and tendering staff had all been instructed to win these tenders at all costs having spoken to people involved in tendering at that stage for EMAS. It may not happen, and they may have done sufficient due diligence, but when you agree to go basically lump sum you are taking execution risk on a tender and asset outside of your management system. Don’t complain later you couldn’t have forseen it, but backlog looks like it is going down so fast they may feel they have few options.

At some point the industry (contractors and financing institutions) are going to have to accept that if all this tonnage remains in operation, and the operating costs are included, then it will have a structural profitability issue without a dramatic change in demand that just isn’t occuring. Yes the Lewek Constellation is a flexible asset, and it can save a variety of vessels working in the field, but those vessels exist now, amongst the current contractors. If an E&P company really wants this specific vessel because of its advantages let them buy it? It only looks more “efficient” in the field compared to other vessels because it isn’t being compared to the historic investments currently solvent contractors have made in a fleet of vessels that collectively perform the same function.

Maybe Subea 7 are looking to retire some older tonnage later on and the easiest way to get over a difficult discussion with the banks was to kick the problem into touch? But at some point the discussion will have to come and I would have thought the banks auditors would have forced it now because in a default situation the value of the vessel is very clear: about USD 43m on a standard capitalised valuation framework. Convincing the auditor that in 36 months you will get a 6x uplift in the day rate when the market forecast is for negligible growth and stable supply strikes me as unlikely in the extreme.

The amount of offshore work may have hit its bottom level and some good contracts are being awarded, but as Eidesvik reminded us today more restructurings are coming, Solutions like this which simply push the eventual reduction in asset values further into the distance will only ensure continued weak profitability for vessel owners (and banks).

Low order backlog defines and highlights lack of current subsea recovery

Three companies that define the subsea industry reported numbers this week: Saipem, TechnipFMC (imagine if they had brought CGG!), and Subsea 7. All were widely varying but the clear theme of overcapacity/ underutilisation remains with subtle variations. Clearly the place to be if possible is light on core assets and long on engineering and execution capability if possible. The core question for the subsea industry remains what proportion of oil demand will be met by offshore production fields (and to a certain extent what the growth of overall demand will be)?

On future market demand the IEA was in the press again today with this:

Less than 5 billion barrels’ worth of conventional oil resources were sanctioned for development last year, down from almost 7 billion barrels in 2015 and 21 billion barrels in 2014, the year oil prices began their slide. Approvals of offshore projects, which are typically more expensive, fell disproportionately, representing 14 per cent of new project sanctions compared with more than 40 per cent on average over the previous 15 years.

Spending on exploration is on course to fall again for the third year running, the IEA said, reducing it to less than half the level seen in 2014, when it stood at more than $120 billion (£92.9 billion).

I have said here before I don’t see offshore production going away. Offshore will clearly continue to be a crucial part of the energy mix. The question, as always, is how much share as the vessel fleet has been built for a far bigger proportion than is currently being demanded. I heard repeated again last week that underinvestment in the current cycle makes a snap back “inevitable” and when this happens offshore will boom again. I’m just not sure I agree as the supply side seems to be out of all proportion to the market and the working capital subsea companies need who are too long on vessels may make the gap too long to bridge given how long it takes for projects to roll out post FID.

While the IEA warns of the this investment crunch Spencer Dale, Chief Economist at BP, is far more sanguine. I quote this speech all the time but its worth requoting a core point:

The US shale revolution has, in effect, introduced a kink in the (short-run) oil supply curve, which should act to dampen price volatility. As prices fall, the supply of shale oil will decline, mitigating the fall in oil prices.

Likewise, as prices recover, shale oil will increase, limiting any spike in oil prices.

Shale oil acts as a form of shock absorber for the global oil market…

To be clear: shale oil is the marginal source of supply only in a temporal sense. The majority of shale oil lies somewhere in the middle of the cost curve. As such, further out, as other types of production have time to adjust and oil companies have to take account of the cost of investing in new drilling rigs and operating platforms, the burden of adjustment is likely to shift gradually away from shale oil towards other forms of production, further up the cost curve.

 

(Emphasis added).

This was written in 2015 and its obvious now that this is exactly what has happened. The sceptic in me struggles with the core logic that rational economic actors are prepared to forgo potentially huge sums by not investing now. If this was such a slam dunk case as the IEA make out then why don’t some smart private equity firms partner with big oil (for the technical skills) and simply develop these fields, when construction costs are at an all-time low? The answer is because it isn’t that simple I suspect.

I am basically a weak-form efficiency believer. I think the oil market is largely rational in the long-run. The long run is a sufficiently amorphous and indeterminate period of time to say that at certain times it can be “irrational” (i.e. USD 27 was to low, but USD 130 was too high), but on average it helps demand and supply meet. But I do realise that one of the problems in the oil market is that many investors in their equity buy them as a dividend stock. Despite the fact that the underlying commodity is extremely volatile in short term pricing (and is likely to be a random walk in anything other than a 1-2 year period), and that therefore E&P companies should really pay out dividends as a proportion of earnings, they quite simply don’t. To E&P companies the dividend is regarded as sacrosanct. Financial economists know this phenomenan well and its formal definition comes in the “Bird in the hand” dividend theory or the “Dividend Clientele Hypothesis“. BIH argues that investors prefer the certainty of dividends to future capital gains and the DCH argues that certain types of investors favour companies that pay dividends (often because of tax or investment mandates). I think they are both right and that the supermajor shareholders in the main are made up of these types of investors.

This means that E&P companies would forgo likely payoffs in the future to keep shareholders happy now (especially as they could fund future CapEx from higher future prices). So I get this could this be happening. And the downside of course is that if you are wrong, and you have made a superbet on this market shortfall in 2020 (or whenever), you end up with a 25 year asset in (e.g.) offshore Brazil that cost USD 3-5bn that you can’t shut down or exit easily that is producing 100 000 bpd at a cost greater than their economic value. Clearly these sort of risk probably work better as part of a portfolio play and hence why the super majors exist: they are an economically rational response to the market issues.

It’s within this context that the results of these offshore contractors need to be seen. The common theme across the industry is that backlog is not returning as quickly as offshore contractors are burning through current work. The other common theme I think is a flight to quality where E&P companies are engaging with tier 1 contractors more and the smaller players will find it increasingly hard. Smaller E&P players Technip and Subsea 7 would never have bothered to court are flattered when they are pursued by these companies offering them the full suite of their capabilities and assets.

Subsea 7 came in with really good EBITDA numbers; but they had the benefit of delivering projects bid at higher margins while procurement is being done at a low point in the cycle. But the other thing Subsea 7 has done really well is utilisation: with fixed vessel costs so high any extra days drop straight to the bottom line. Active utilisation of 65% for their fleet is exceptional in this market (compare to Oympic). I have no idea if this is an apocrophyl story or not but I was told a year or so ago that Kristian Siem instructed Subsea 7 management that he personally has to sign off on all vessel charters using third-party tonnage now, to encourage projects crews to use a Subsea 7 or Siem vessel. Even if its not true I think the mindset is and it fits in with what all the line managers are saying about Subsea 7 in the market: they are extremely aggressive on vessel days (for example remving the Pelican from cold stack for Apache in the North Sea). Don’t get me wrong it’s smart and necessary: Subsea 7, with 34 vessels, just have to get them working or they will have a credit event, and its good execution.

But the Seven Mar and the Seven Navica are in still in cold stack. The Navica in particular is a talisman for North Sea construction activity. Until that vessel is busy doing small scale field developments then by definition the North Sea (an UKCS in particular) will be oversupplied with DSVs and overly dependent on maintenance rather than construction work. The fact that these assets are in cold stack (and it’s not only Subsea 7) means there is an enormous amount of latent capacity in the sysytem that could respond to increased E&P demand very quickly. Portable lay spreads and ad-hoc systems (like the one on the Bibby Polaris) have also grown in number in recent years and could be quickly activated.

Saipem also came in with a poor order book at 0.2x book-to-bill (i.e. it replaced 20% of the revenue billed this quarter with new work). It can overshadow the fact that Saipem is still a really big company with an annual turnover of 10bn, a great franchise in some very difficult regions (which make it less margin sensitive), and a wealth of technical expertise. But the problem Saipem has is that it is an average drilling company and a quality subsea/ pipeline company. All the drilling companies are restructuring and coming back with very strong balance sheets for the next few years and Saipem has some major drilling contract renewals next year and its not hard to see revenue dropping like a stone in that business. Having raised €3.5bn in a rights issue Saipem then had to go back and write €2.1bn off (non cash), but it is trying to pay back its lenders 100c in € whereas all their competitors are engaged in debt-for-equity swaps. It’s totally unsustainable. Not like EZRA where it was obviously going to happen near term, this is a slow battle of attrition as more and more time and equity gets devoted to the Sisyphian task of trying to generate economic value with an overvalued asset base (in a relartive sense) that has a higher fixed cost base.

Which is a shame because the Saipem offshore construction business, with a fleet of quality assets, an eviable project track record, and huge intellectual capital, despite being buried in a Byzantine organisational structure, is a great business. With the right balance sheet and strategic direction the Saipem Offshore E&C business could be a world leader, it is long all the assets you can’t possibly charter (nor would you want to), such as heavylift and and pipelay (J and S), and long on engineering capability. Every other subsea asset you can be short on at the moment because the vessel market is oversupplied and will be for a long time. Even diving for shallow water construction can be handled internally with chartered tonnage.

There is no real resolution here. Saipem is reorganising (again).  But I doubt you could could realistically seperate out the different divisions in an equitable way from a capital markets perspective. From a subsea perspective the remaining three business lines (onshore and offshore drilling) will just detract from the potential of what should be a tier 1 powerhouse (even if it does make the Italian post office look efficient).

Which brings us on nicely to TechnipFMC… low order book in Subsea while reasonably good numbers. It is the industry bellweather at the moment, no one can do in deepwater what they can, and if they cannot replace their orderbook  the total addressable market will be smaller.

I’m clearly no expert on the oil market but it is clear that offshore investment does not appear to have stabilised yet. Until the core companies in the industry have reasonable amounts of backlog it is too early to talk of a recovery. And the IEA may be right that we are currently underinvesting, but for offshore the key is the snapback: if it comes, it is likely to be less dramatic for anyone who is too long on vessel capacity, but for those with delivery capability and intellectual property it is a different story.