Bully for Brontosaurus…

“I am truly convinced that both the shipping and the offshore markets will recover.”

Mads Syversen, CEO Arctic Securities (26 Jan 2016)

Arctic and ABG Merger valuation.png

From the Solstad Farstad merger prospectus (9 May 2017) highglighting the extreme optimism of the investment bankers putting the deal together. It should be noted the asset market was under huge stress at the time (the bankers of course were paid in cash on completion).

The Golden Bough

In point of fact magicians appear to have often developed into chiefs and kings.

 James George Frazer, “The Golden Bough” (1890)

The Emporer

Courtier T.L. — Amid all the people starving, missionaries and nurses clamoring, students rioting, and police cracking heads, His Serene Majesty went to Eritrea, where he was received by his grandson, Fleet Commander Eskinder Desta, with whom he intended to make an official cruise on the flagship Ethiopia. They could only manage to start one engine, however, and the cruise had to be called off. His Highness then moved to the French ship Protet, where he was received on board by Hiele, the well-known admiral from Marseille. The next day, in the port of Massawa, His Most Ineffable Highness raised himself for the occasion to the rank of Grand Admiral of the Imperial Fleet, and made seven cadets officers, thereby increasing our naval power. Also he summoned the wretched notables from the north who had been accused by the missionaries and nurses of speculation and stealing from the starving, and he conferred high distinctions on them to prove that they were innocent and to curb the foreign gossip and slander.

 Ryszard Kapuscinski, “The Emperor” (1978)

Mons Aase, DOF Subsea CEO, said: “The appointment of Mr. Riise is an important step towards realizing our vision of being a world-class integrated offshore company, delivering marine services and subsea solutions responsibly, balancing risk and opportunity in a sustainable way, together, every day. I look forward to working closely with our new CCO and I welcome Steinar to DOF Subsea.” (15 October, 2018)

“Our business will probably die over the next 10 yrs because the demand for oil probably will start peaking – we think in 2028-2029.”

Ian Taylor, Vittol Chairman, June 8, 2019

“If you get lucky for a long period of time, you think the rules don’t apply to you… These guys thought they could walk on water. They weren’t smart, they were lucky”.

Maarten Van Eden, Anglo Irish Bank CFO, in Anglo Republic: The Bank that Broke Ireland

(Anglo Irish bank initially assessed its downside losses in the credit crunch at less than €2bn. Over €45bn later they had nearly bankrupted the Irish state by lending on illiquid property assets reliant on a booming Irish economy and a global credit boom).

 

Have a look at the graph in the header, particularly 2016/17, and then the Solstad liabilities for 2016/17, just as they were “buying” Farstad and DeepSea Supply:

Solstad liabilities 2016_17.png

(I saying “buying” because it was then second major rescue attempt after Aker made a spectacular error in timing with REM. It was a deal pushed by the bankers who didn’t want to deal with consequences of Farstad and Deepsea Supply).

That would be just the time the rig count in the Permain was to explode:

BH rig count June 2019.jpg

And here are the latest Solstad Q1 2019 liability figues:

Solstad Q1 2019 Liabilities.png

Roughly NOK 2bn higher! The assets are older, the market isn’t much better, and they owe NOK 2bn more! (Don’t get me started on look at the assets side of the balance sheet: it was well known the Farstad/DESS were worth significantly less than book value).

If you believed Solstad had a future in anything like its current form you would be asked to believe the impossible: that despite the most extraordinary structural shift the oil and gas industry, despite owning depreciating assets barely covering actual running costs, despite no indication of oversupply ending (and in fact every indication that funding a mutually assured destructive battle will continue with NAO planning to raise money), you would be asked to believe Solstad could actually pay that money back… And of course they can’t: the numbers on paper, the amounts the banks and creditors claim they are due, are indeed a fantasy. A wish, with no basis in economic substance despite their accounting clarity.

Solstad made an operating profit of NOK 162 918 000 in Q1 2019 on NOK 33bn of balance sheet and asset risk. If someone had lost the petty cash tin they would have been in a loss. It’s totally unsustainable.

It may have been reasonable to believe that NOK 30bn of debt could be supported by offshore demand when the US graph was at 2014 levels but it is no longer credible now. Too much of the investment and maintenance expenditure flowing through the global energy industry is just going to other places. This is a structural shift in the industry not a temporary drop in demand like 2009.

I am not picking on Solstad here, they are just the most obvious example as their resolution seems (reasonably) imminent. Without exception all these crazy asset play deals that relied on the market coming back will fail.

When I was at university I first read the palaeontologist Stephen J Gould who introduced me to the difference between Lamarckian and Darwinian evolution (Bully for Brontasaurus). If you can’t bothered clicking through to the links the easiest way to think about this (in a purely demonstrative example) is that Lamarckian evolution argues that giraffes evolved by gradually growing longer necks and reaching for higher leaves on trees that others couldn’t reach – which is wrong. One of the many brilliant things about Darwin was that he realised that it was the randomness in evolution that caused the process – giraffes that just happened to have the long neck gene prospered and had more baby giraffes and passed the gene on. The race of giraffes that prospered was the result of random selection that ended up adapting best to their environment. They got lucky not smart.

Offshore is full of companies that may have been lucky on the way up but are totally inappropriate financial and operational structures to survive in the modern energy era. Evolution is a brutal, mechanical, and forward acting process. It is irreversible and path dependent. In economics the randomness of the evolutionary process is well understood with most research showing industry effects are stronger than firm effects. By dint of randomness the genes of many of the asset heavy offshore companies companies, but especially those with debt held constant at 2015/16 levels, are fundamentally unsuited to their new environment.

In case you are wondering where I am going with this (and want to stop reading now) I have two points:

  • A lot of the offshore supply chain confused managerial brilliance on the ride up to 2014 with good luck, a high oil price, and a credit bubble. Seemingly being lucky enough to have been running small fishing vessels when North Sea oil was found was rarely posited as an explanation for the growth of many West Coast Norwegian offshore firms, but it is in reality true. A random act of economic circumstance that threw them into a rising commodity and credit bubble. A newer, far less wealthy, future beckons for many of the small coastal towns that supported this boom.
  • The randomness of US geology colliding with the most efficient capital markets in the world, the largest energy consuming nation, and technological circumstance has caused a complete change in the structure in the underlying oil market. The profound implication for North Sea producers, and the supply chain underpinning them, is a transition to be an ever more marginal part of the global supply chain. That will mean less dollars in flow to them and that however long companies try to fight this will be in vain because we are dealing with a profound structural change not a temporary reduction in demand.

What the offshore industry is faced with now is a fundamental regime change – in its broadest sense both statistically (which I have argued before) and sociologically. The economic models of debt fuelled boats and rigs with smaller contractors are over in principal. It’s just the messy and awkward stage of getting to the other side that beckons now.

For pure SURF contracting and drilling consolidation is the answer and will occur. Financial markets will squeeze all but the largest companies from taking asset risk. DOF Subsea’s business model of buying ships Technip wasn’t sure about long-term will look like the short term aberration to economic rationality it was. For offshore supply the industry will be structurally less profitable forever. Asia shows the future of offshore is a vast array of smaller contractors, operating on minimal margin and taking vast risks, and yet the E&P companies are happy with this outcome because they get competitive prices. There is no reason to believe this model will not work in Europe as well. Where procurement is regional there are no advantages to being a global operator as the unit onshore costs are such a small proportion of the offshore/asset costs.

Although it feels unique to many in offshore it isn’t. If you only read one book about a collapse of ancien regime make sure it is Ryszard Kapuscinski’s “The Emperor” (1978)  on the collapsing Ethiopian empire. By interviewing a large number of the courtiers Kapuscinski gets you into the collective mind of an institution unable to face the reality of circumstance. The inability of Haile Selassie to realise that his random luck was totally unsuited to adaptation in the modern world is deeply reminiscent of the management in offshore, and to a certain extent the banks behind it (I’ll write more on the Stiglitz- Grossman paradox which answers why this may occur later).

Slowly the power and the capital of marginal oil production is being shifted to the Lower 48. Make no mistake the replacement of low capital cost Super Majors for high cost of capital (often PE backed) E&P companies in the North Sea marks the slow withdrawal of capital long-term from the area. Note not removal: just slower investment, higher cost hurdles, more pressure on cost etc. That will require a structurally smaller supply chain.

Old capital structures, and especially debt obligations, written in the good times will be completely re-written. Over the next couple of years the Nordic banks are going to write off billions dollars (that isn’t a misprint) as the hope thesis of recovery loses credibility. They will shut down credit to all but the most worth borrowers and sellable assets (if you think that is happening now you aren’t watching the crazy deals going on in the rig market). Equity across the industry will rise and leverage will substantially decline.  Smaller operators will vanish driven the same process reducing biodiversity on earth now: a less munificent environment. I believe when these banks have to start really taking write-offs, and Solstad and DOF are important here because they are close in time and significant in value, bank loan books will in effect close for all but the largest companies. In the rig market where are few companies have been responsible for nearly all the deals and private bubble has built up in the assets this will be contrasted with a nuclear winter of credit. And if banks aren’t lending then asset values fall dramatically.

How much is the Skandi Nitteroi really worth? There is no spot market for PLSVs, Petrobras have no tenders for flexlay? No one else capable using it needs one and Seadras are getting theirs redelivered? Banks are going to take the hit here and then the industry will really feel it.

I am reading Anglo Republic, a book about the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank, at the moment. Again the inability of management (and Treasury, and the goverment) to see the scale of the losses has a strong parallel with offshore. And like offshore initially everyone believed the Irish propery market would come back, that liquidity not solvency was the problem, that this was temporary blip. The crisis was a slow burner for this reason. But when it really came, just like all asset heavy industries, it starts with the refusal of credit institutions to renew liquidity lines because they know it’s a solvency problem. And that is why Solstad and and DOF are significant. They are the BNP Paribas of the next phase. But you know what… my next book is this, and it will have the same story of excessive optimism, leverage, an event (literally a revolution in this case), and default. If there are only really seven major plots in literature there is surely smaller set in economic history? So we know what is coming here.

This needs to happen in an economic sense. The cost to produce offshore will have to rise to reflect the enormous risk the supply chain take in supplying these hugely unique assets on a contract basis. But for this to happen there needs to be a major reduction in supply and it needs to happen while competing against shale for E&P production share. And it cannot happen while the industry continues to attract liquidity from those who buy assets solely on the basis of their perceived discount to 2016 asset values in the hope of a ‘recovery’ to previous profitability levels.

Which brings us on to what will happen to Solstad? It is in the interests of both the major equity investors (Aker/ Fredrikson) and the banks to play for time here. I fully expect a postponement of the 20 June deadline. Next summer, the bankers will tell themselves, the rates will be high and we will be fine (just like the Irish bankers and countless others before). But some of the smaller syndicate banks clearly get the picture here, the business is effectively trading while insolvent, regulators will also eventually lose patience, and the passage of time will not be kind. The solution everyone wants: to put no more money in and get all their money back isn’t going to happen.

Normally in situations like this, where the duration of the assets is long and illiquid, like a failed bank, a ‘bad bank’ and a ‘good bank’ are created. One runs down (as DVB Bank is doing with offshore) and the good one trades and is sold (as DVB Bank have done with aircraft finance). That would see the Solstad of old split off into a CSV fleet maybe or a Solstad North Sea while the old Asian/Brazil DESS was liquidated and the Farstad AHTS business also liquidated. But that will require the banks writing off c. NOK 20bn (maybe more) and I don’t think they are there yet.

After Solstad comes DOF. And in all likelihood following them will be some smaller tier 2 contractors, and certainly some rig companies, who realize that in an economic sense this just cannot continue. No matter how hard they keep reaching for the greener leaves higher up.

Deflation, Shell, and Bourbon…

Shell gave a strategy update this week (the graphic above is from the presentation). More of the same really if you read this blog: more investment in shale and targeted and steady investment in offshore:

Shell 2025 outlook.png

And you can see the effect that over time Deep Water will be an increasingly smaller (but still important) part of production at Shell:

Shell 2025 Investment Tilt.png

But there is a clear tilt to shale and power. Yes they are spending more but the supply chain aren’t getting it:

Shell cost reduction to 2025.png

Shell Vendor Spend.png

For the offshore supply chain this is a very different world because a large number of the assets were acquired when that 2015 number was sloshing around the industry along with all the other money. Boats and rigs were ordered with 2015 dollars in mind and those days are long gone.

This is an age of deflation. Oil companies can, and have, sustainably changed the cost of production and met long-term demand expectations. The last offshore asset price bubble required both a demand boom and a credit boom. The demand boom has clearly gone and instead of the credit boom were are starting to see a credit contraction in a meaningful sense.

Slowly banks are realising that when the industry declines this much they don’t own and asset (loan), all they really own is a claim to the economic value an asset can produce. For all offshore assets that is much lower now than it was in 2015, and therefore those assets are not going to pay back anything like all the money they owe in an accounting sense. Slowly some banks stop rolling over credit, as has happened with DOF and Solstad among other firms, and the liquidity really starts to dry up.

The smaller banks are trying to force the larger banks to buy them out of these positions. This is clearly what is happening at DOF and Solstad. The larger banks in these deals will have to double down or accept large write-offs. In addition the number of hedge funds and other who have lost money on asset recovery plays is now so large that selling these deals is all but impossible (see Seadrill). Easy to get into but very hard to get out.

Bourbon creditors appear to have realised this.  A restructuring proposal has been sent to the Board for consideration. In reality the default is so large the creditors own the company. The creditors will write down billions of debt, Bourbon will reappear as a new financial entity, looking operationally a lot like the old, but like everyone else in the market believing their assets must be worth at least what they restructured them at. Capacity will be kept high and competition will ensure rates continue at below economic levels. It is a parable of the whole industry at the moment which shows no sign of abatement. Watching with interest DOF and Solstad because the larger Nordic banks stand to lose some real money here and yet the investment required to go on pretending would seem untouchable to any serious investor without write-offs in the billions of NOK from the banks. As offshore supply leads so will the rig companies as the head for their second round of restructurings (who inexplicably still seem to have access to bank financing).

But this is crazy world we live in. Much like the dotcom boom people are going to ask one day how they ever put money into a shipping company that excluded the cost of running a ship from it’s reported numbers:

  1. Positive EBITDA (adj.) of USD 617 thousands, excluding start-up cost, dry dock, special survey and maintenance (Q1 18 USD 400 thousands) from chartering out the 5 large –sized PSV’s. Including the ownership in Northern Supply AS (25.53%) the group netted a positive EBITDA (adj.) excluding start-up cost, dry dock, special survey and maintenance of USD 518 thousands (Q1 18 USD 200 thousands).

This isn’t going to happen quickly. Credit effects take significantly longer to work through than demand side effects. Once these banks have written off loans in a meaningful sense getting them to lend against these assets again will be nearly impossible.

And yet the cost pressure will continue:

Shell Cost pressure.png

The Emporers New Clothes… Seadrill Redux…

As a quick update to my last post on Seadrill (in which I was making a semi-serious point). I had a quick flick through the Seadrill 6k so you don’t have to… But first a little background… this post I wrote in April last year “Seadrill restructuring… secular or cyclical industry change?” seems to have aged well. In particular I noted:

[According to their restructuring plan in] 2019 Seadrill needs to grow revenue 65% to lose $415m of cash after turning over $2bn. In 2020 Seadrill then needs to grow 40% again, and only then do they generate $25m after meeting all their obligations. A rounding error. A few thousand short on day rates or a few percentage points in utilisation adrift and they will lose some real money.

Have another look at their business plan they had released in April last year:

Seadrill forecast P&L 2018.png

How is that “forecast” on revenue going? Seadrill did $302m in Q1 2019, which if they keep at that level is a rounding error above 2018. But it is more than 30% less where they thought they would be only a year ago. It’s not that long ago to be like $600m (of only $1.9bn) out… just saying… it’s more than a minor forecasting error… (go back and look at my post they were already downgraded and had been based on numbers supplied by a reputable IB with an analyst who currently has a Buy rating on SDRL).

Now just be to clear Seadrill was also forecasting they would generate $721m in EBITDA (a proxy for cash flow and an ability to service their debt). We have now passed the Q1, where they generated $72m, and guided $60m for Q2. So if we annualise that (which is generous as they got an unexpected $12m in Q1) they are on target for (max) $250m; around 1/3 of what they thought.

The $7.2bn of debt remains of course and was the (only?) accurate part of the forecast. Immovable and a testament to the willingness of humans to believe something that cannot possibly be true.

The numbers are clearly a disaster. The business plan above is a fantasy and Seadrill is heading for Chapter 22. Relatively quickly.

If you’re interested here’s how bad it is:

Seadrill actually did less revenue last quarter than the one the year before:

Seadrill Revenues Q1 2019.png

But had the same number of rigs working:

SDRL rigs working Q1 2019.png

And therefore the obvious… day rates have dropped…

SDRL Day Rates Q1 2019.png

And that is your microcosm for the whole industry offshore and subsea. Excess capacity means that even if you can find new work it is at lower rates.

Also, and I keep banging on about this, what are they going to do when Petrobras starts handing back the PLSVs this year? DOF’s are in lay-up, and there is no spot market for PLSVs. The equity in that JV is likely zero. Even if Petrobras does start re-tendering for PLSVs (unlikely given the drop in the number of floaters working) all that beckons is a price war with DOF to get them working. Anything above running costs will be a victory if the vessel market is a guide.

It goes without saying that in a price deflationary environment it is only a question of how long the banks can pretend they will be made whole here. SDRL isn’t going to get to $1.9bn in revenue this year and it certainly isn’t getting to $2.6bn the year after unless they change their reporting figures to the Argentinian Peso.

When I have more time I will explain my point on this more… but in the meantime be reassured the 23% drop the other day was  not an anomoly. The real question is why it took so long (and yes I do have a theory:). The investment bankers dream of someone buying Seadrill almost as much as Seadrill’s lending banks, but I find it highly unlikely (but not impossible) someone will make good $7bn in debt, and putting to stones together doesn’t mean they will float.

But the core point is that this is part of a deep structural change in the oil production market where offshore is not the marginal producer of choice any more. Previously that meant short-term oil price effects had a large (extremely pro-cyclical) effects on an industry with a very long-run supply curve, and this was combined with a credit bubble between 2009-2014. If my theory is right, and it has held up well for the past few years, then the much predicted,  but never appearing, demand-side boom will remain the Unicorn it has been for the past few years: a chimera that only appears in investment bank and shipbroker slide-decks.

That marginal producer is the now that shale industry a point Spencer Dale made a very long time ago now:

An important consequence of these characteristics is that the short-run responsiveness of shale oil to price changes will be far greater than that for conventional oil. As prices fall, investment and drilling activity will decline and production will soon follow. But as prices recover, investment and production can be increased relatively quickly. The US shale revolution has, in effect, introduced a kink in the (short-run) oil supply curve, which should act to dampen price volatility. As prices fall, the supply of shale oil will decline, mitigating the fall in oil prices. Likewise, as prices recover, shale oil will increase, limiting any spike in oil prices. Shale oil acts as a form of shock absorber for the global oil market.

Ignoring this fact lets you produce a “Key Financials” slide that bears no obvious relationship to how the market is really going to evolve. There is a lot of pain to come for the offshore industry as the need for banks to make painful writeoffs starts to permeate through the system and finally even more painfully capacity will be permanently removed from the market. This is an industry that needs significantly less capital and capacity to generate economic profits. And as I say: this is the recovery.

More evidence this is the offshore “recovery”…

I was going to write this anyway today and then looked at the oil price as I was leaving work… down 2.7% at the time of pixel… The graph above comes from the Dallas Fed blog which makes this salient point and helps explain why:

Given current market prices, U.S. shale production will continue growing this year. Indeed, a recent report by the International Energy Agency highlighted that shale production is likely to be a major driver over the next five years. This does not rule out the possibility of major oil price movements, but it does point to a strong tendency that oil prices will be range bound in the near future.

Read the whole thing. Shale has structurally changed the oil industry and fundamentally changed any realistic scenarios for an “offshore recovery”.

Contrast that with the investment boom in shale: If you want to see how the whole ecosystem of companies and innovation are working in a harmony to make US shale more efficient, deepen the capital base, and thereby work in a virtuous circle then this article from the Houston Chronicle that showcases a GEBH project to turn flared gas into power in the region is a great anecdote:

Baker Hughes is using the Permian Basin in West Texas to debut a fleet of new turbines that use excess natural gas from a drilling site to power hydraulic fracturing equipment — reducing flaring, carbon dioxide emissions, people and equipment in remote locations…

Baker Hughes estimates 500 hydraulic fracturing fleets are deployed in shale basins across the United States and Canada. Most of them are powered by trailer-mounted diesel engines. Each fleet consumes more than 7 million gallons of diesel per year, emits an average of 70,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide and require 700,000 tanker truck loads of diesel supplied to remote sites, according to Baker Hughes.

“Electric frack enables the switch from diesel-driven to electrical-driven pumps powered by modular gas turbine generating units,” Simonelli said. “This alleviates several limiting factors for the operator and the pressure pumping company such as diesel truck logistics, excess gas handling, carbon emissions and the reliability of the pressure pumping operation.”

More capital, greater efficiency, and capital deepening. It is a virtuous circle that increases productivity and economic returns and is the signal for firms to invest more. It is a completely different investment dynamic to the one driving offshore projects at the moment.

Shale productivity.png

The above graph from the IEA makess a point I have made any times here: there is no real cost pressure in shale beyond labour (which will drop in the long run). Shale is all about productivity and cost improvement driven by mass production, something the US economy has as an almost intrinsic quality. The cost improvements in offshore are solely the result of over-capitalised assets earning less than their economic rate of return (i.e. oversupply) and is clearly not sustainable in the long run.

That is why firms with a low cost of capital are vacating fields like the North Sea to firms with a higher cost of capital: one requires steady investment and scale, the other investment is a punt on a shortage and price inflation. [A post for another day will be on how on earth some of these larger investors actually get out of the North Sea.]

This IEA data also tells you why this is the offshore reocvery:

IEA 2019 investment mix.png

The IEA is also forecasting overall spending to increase just 6%. So offshore just isn’t getting investment at the margin that will drive fleet utilisation and expansion. In company accounts this is showing up as depreciation significantly outpacing investment and is a constant across the industry. The economics of offshore are such that profitability is dictated by marginal demand (i.e. that one extra day of utilisation at a higher rate) and this graph shows the industry built a fleet for a far higher level and the only realistic prospect here is for structurally lower profitability. Given the high capital costs of the assets this is going to take a long time for the oversupply to work out.

For manufacturers (i.e. subsea trees) the recession is generally over, although not for Weatherford, but if it floats nothing but a wall of oversupply and below economic pricing and therefore sub economic returns is the logical consequence of this industry structure and market dynamic.

The hope of a massive demand boom kept banks from foreclosing and led hedge funds and other alternative capital providers putting money into assets that were (and are) losing cash but seen as “valuable” in the future. Slowly it is becoming apparent there is no credible path to anything other than liquidation for many companies still in business.

Rates will slowly rise, and so will utilisation levels, but only to economic levels i.e. covering their cost of capital in a perfectly competitive market. Absent a demand boom liquidity slowly, and then quickly, vanishes. And that is finally starting to happen now. For example the McDermott 10.25% 2024 bonds, already very expensive, were trading at well below par today implying a 13.5% yield, in effect locking them out of the unsecured credit market completely (and in reality all credit markets). A restructuring beckons. MDR will not be the only one by any stretch. Many rig companies will do a Chap 22 and a wave of supply companies in Europe and Asia are uneconomic and simply cannot survive under realistic financial assumptions.

Slowly the overcapacity in the industry will work its way out to more economically sustainable day rates with higher utilisation levels in a smaller global offshore rig and vessel fleet. But it won’t be a return to 2013, it will be a return to a far lower profitability level despite the smaller fleet, higher prices, and less time and utilisation risk taken smaller companies. There will be a complete wipe-out, almost without exception, of investors who backed offshore “recovery” theses of asset backed companies and an inability of these companies to access funding almost at any price levels. Theories about assets recovering to values implied by book value will be realised for what they are: a fantasy no serious person could believe.

But a far more rational industry and market will emerge. The only thing that could change the dynamic outlined above is a massive demand boom, and the graphs above show you why that isn’t going to happen.

IEA global upstream investment 2019.png

Buying time for a managed exit from Deep Sea Supply….

The solution to a debt crisis is rarely more debt and a complete avoidance of the issue. From Solstad:

The Financial Restructuring includes a deferral of scheduled instalments, interests and bareboat payments until December 31st, 2019 in a total amount of approximately USD 48 mill. The Financial Restructuring also entails suspension of the majority of financial covenants in the same period.

As part of the Financial Restructuring, SI-3 will be provided a loan from Sterna Finance Ltd. in the amount of USD 27 million, which shall be applied for general corporate purposes in SI-3.

So the banks stop time and Fredriksen (Sterna Financial) lends the company $27m to get them through the next 18 months? And then what? Day rates rise and solve everything? Where that loan sits in the capital structure will be interesting…

Ships depreciate. That means they are worth less next year than this year ceteris paribus, and therefore their earning power is reduced. This plan is predicated on the fact that this is the bottom of the market and the vessels must work next year. Good luck with that. For the old Deep Sea Supply vessels this is your competition.  Yet in 18 months time they have to earn, after OpEx, $48m just to keep the creditors at bay? It’s just not serious. All the more so because the vessels have an Asian focus and there is widespread agreement that that is the most price-competitive oversupplied region in the world.

All this deal does is keep potential credible supply in the market. The problem for any industry rebalancing is the perceived capital value is so high compared to the actual layup or running costs, and that is an industry wide problem. Pacific Radiance, EMAS, Solship, etc., they can’t all survive at current demand levels, but while they try it is mutually assured destruction.

#lastrollofthedice surely?

Which leads me to believe that all involved know this. Have a look at the bulk of these assets and their status:

SF PSV.pngSF AHTS.png

No lenders really believe they are getting paid all they are owed here surely? My guess is that the JF money has been provided on some sort of “super senior” basis, which gets paid out before the banks, and provides working capital while the next 18 months is spent trying to unwind the Solstad exposure to the DESS fleet. The banks don’t write off anything because it protects their legal position to the claim and preserves the illusion of commitment (and allows the loss to be booked later). A managed wind-down of a clearly not viable business that avoids an immediate firesale would seem the most likely scenario here. A bottle of champagne awaits the first person to send me the IM 🙂

 

Greece, Solstad Farstad, and other restructurings…

The recent Greek debt deal is proof that when no other option exists lenders will sometimes do the right thing. Greece it should be remembered was a banking crisis as well as a sovereign debt crisis, and although the Greek banks are recovering five years after the first major ructions they are still on life support from the ECB. This should provide both some degree of hope and reality for Solsatd Farstad when they announce where they are on the latest restructuring this week. I understand that as part of the process the Farstad name will be dropped in October/ November and the Farstad’s will sell out and not be associated with the company.

The banks and investors now seem to be aware of the scale of the problem here and realize that a booming market isn’t coming and isn’t going to save anyone. The high-end AHTS have even had disappointing day rates relative to expectations (hopes?) and the Q2 numbers will simply not bank enough for a long idle winter to give anyone real comfort. And all the while the Deep Sea Supply fleet festers like a cancer on what healthy tissue remains in the body. Now only an agreement with the banks can  provide any long term solution.

Offshore companies remind me of banks in a funding sense, hence why I mention Greece, as the debt dynamics and issues are broadly similar. Offshore vessel operators fund themselves in charter markets that are significantly shorter than the economic life of the assets they buy. Charter periods dropped from 5-8 years in the early 2000s to complete spot market/ at risk vessels by 2013/14. That is complete market risk funding the purchase of a 25 year asset.

Banks also borrow-short and lend-long, in simplistic terms they borrow money as deposits and lend them to businesses for significantly longer periods of time, and while the deposits can be drawn down as requested the loans cannot. There is in effect a funding mismatch called “maturity transformation” which creates value.

This same sort of duration mis-match between the vessels owned and the charter market created huge value for offshore vessel and rig companies in a booming market. Vessel owners committed to 25 year assets, with 10 year loans on 12-15 year repayment profiles, and funded this in some cases purely in the spot market. In trading terms it was a carry-trade with the high yield short term market being funded by a long term lending market. This was a totally procyclical financial phenomenon that meant the short-term market had a pricing premium compared to the long term cost to anyone who took the risk to commit assets to the short-term market. Now, just like a banking crisis, there has been a freeze in the short-end of the market and this is impacting their ability to meet long term commitments. As Paul Krugman stated “if you borrow short and lend long you are a hedge fund and should be regulated like one”, and that is in effect the embedded funding profile of many offshore operators prior to 2014.

That model is now dead, although not completely, but I think this is the most important, and maybe the least discussed, part of the industry change. And there will be change, not through any grand initiative, but eventually as the market recovers and banks lend on offshore assets again they will force the counterparty to have a longer term contract, and gradually the time/duration risk will be more equitably split than it currently is in an oversupplied market. But I think that is going to take a long time.

It will also mean for smaller E&P operators, marginal producers, their costs could increase significantly for assets on the spot market… and they should! Building assets in the tens-to-hundreds of millions and relying on the spot market to clear them just isn’t rational, as is currently being shown. Being able to call up a jack-up PSV, AHTS, CSV or whatever at a moment’s notce and get it delivered in a few hours or days is currently proving to be a terrible business model for asset owners. Longer term the industry should move to larger operators with a series of longer contracts that roll off in a time efficient way rather than everyone thinking they can clear excess capacity in a short-term market. Larger E&P companies will commit to longer contracts and get a much lower margin as a result. Those providing short term assets will have to charge a substantial premium for this given the risk involved but it will be a smaller, risker part of the market, with substantial amounts of equity to cushion the cyclicality required. It is this factor that I think will drive consolidation far more than any cost savings: how much idle time can your business model handle?

The solution is therefore going to look like banking resolutions in Europe. Traditionally that has meant either a) bankruptcy/insolvency (and there is still more of this to come), or; b) a good bank/ bad bank split (e.g. Novo Banco). Solstad I think could eventually go this way: Solship 3/ Deep Sea Supply was an early attempt at this but failed. More radical solutions are needed now but the final solution will end up more like this. In order to compete with Standard Drilling and others in the North Sea the banks behind Solstad would need to equitise their entire expsoure to the PSV fleet and the most likely new “bad bank” starts here. The “bad bank” they already own, Deep Sea Supply, needs to be cauterised. All the banks have with these assets anyway is a claim to some future value when the market recovers and they want someone else to pay the OpEx to get there. It might have worked in 2016 but the investment narrative has changed since then.

These are moves that take months not weeks and not all the stakeholders are in the same place. A cold winter with lots of tied up vessels is likely to bring these groups closer together. Resolution is some way off. Eventually, when all the other options have been exhausted, the banks are likely to do the right thing here.

Der Schrei der Natur …

It is very likely that the North Sea starts next summer without Ocean Installer, M2 Subsea, and Bibby Offshore. In fact I am going for probable rather than possible. Private equity owners are looking at having to inject real cash resources into these businesses and they are not happy given the prospects of getting it back.

Another minor sign: more changing of the guard in the tier two contractors with Bibby Offshore now parting company with their CEO today. This looks stage managed coming almost 6 months to day after York Capital took control (6 months is a standard BOHL executive notice period). Although there are clearly some specific circumstances in play here the driving force at Bibby Offshore is the same as at the other tier two contractors: the cash crunch (see here). As business plans are developed for next year, and the poor summer season continues, Boards are facing up to the fact they will need new funding for next year.

Just as the Board of Ocean Installer demanded a plan that saw HitecVision sever the cash umbilical this year, so Bibby Offshore had to go through the farce of a “recapitalisation” late last year (which was more Rabelais than reason). It was frankly an embarrasment (and here) although it has led to a severe dispute between York (who fell for it) and its authors EY.

Now in 2018 York are having to do it again with Bibby who have no path to cash flow profitability. Bibby Offshore is very vulnerable: In financial terms they are likely to consume £10-15m in cash this calender year, then start next year needing to put Polaris through a 4th special survey (£2-3m?) and Sapphire through an intermediate (£1m?). At current run rate they may need £10m more in cash before next April. It’s grim.

I don’t believe a sale of the business is realistic now it has this trading history behind it (see here). A potential buyer is now gets a business locked in a battle with Boskalis at the low-end and TechnipFMC and Subsea 7 at the top-end. Without a sustained improvement in market conditions, which now will not come at the earliest until summer 2019, the shareholders face another hefty cash call. And all to fund more of the same: a subscale business battling giants and losing cash with an increasingly aging asset base. It’s a hard pitchbook for investment bankers to write. There is no upside here in terms of expansion potential or margin expansion. And it’s very risky. Why not leave your money in the bank?

It’s sad for me to see but the honest truth is it was Bibby Line Group that killed the business: a 50% dividend policy in a capital intensive business like offshore simply cannot work long-term. The GBP 175m bond, the only real money Bibby Offshore ever had, was used to pay off SCB (USD 110m) and then a dividend recap to group of ~£35m. There were never funds to grow the business when the market boomed and no equity as a cushion when the market tanked. We are in the final stages of a tragic denouement now.

York are in a terrible position now with no realistic course of recovering their investment and no logical argument to keep putting money in. A dispute with EY over the “missing £50m” is apparently causing some tension between the two firms. The story as I have heard it (from a person directly involved in the deal) was that EY had their numbers wrong and had miscalculated the financial runway Bibby had. York realised too late and “had” to follow through not seeing how bad the current downside could be. On current performance the bondholders would be better off with the EY liquidation assumptions than current exit strategies would imply.

Quite how a self-professed set of financial geniuses and a Big 4 missed the obvious fact that a firm losing £1m in cash a week would run out of money quickly is being kept quiet for obvious reasons (see here June 2017). York blame EY but really it was obvious to any outside observer with a basic knowledge of offshore economics that this would happen and it’s just embarrassing for both parties.

The new management have strong experience with Songa and are in all likelihood extremely capable and talented individuals. They are unfortunately not alchemists and the fact is that the North Sea DSV and small projects market has not had a rebound of the scale needed to help firms of this size and it suffers from chronic overcapacity. Until the CapEx market comes back, and we know from field development plans it cannot in the short-term for the UKCS, then this situation will not change. It is a commitment battle and the firm with the highest cost of capital and smallest balance sheet will lose.

Throughout the supply chain this continues: Olympic Subsea came out with numbers last week and it shows again that this continues to be a broad, deep, structural market contraction. Have a look at the cash flow because at the moment nothing else matters:

Olympic Cash Flow Q1 2018.png

Olympic spent more on financial repayments in Q1 2018 than they received net from operating the vessels. And despite talk of a market improvement they have 3 CSVs for fairly close delivery available by the end of August. Olympic look like the will make it to their 2020 runway with the cash they have on hand, but then what? This summer isn’t going to save them only slow the cash burn.

For those without the cash the decisions are starting to get ominiously close.The North Sea summer next year is likely to have  a very different economic ecosystem from the one currently exists.