If you want to know what the cost of raising funds for a corporation in trouble following a failed acquisition is the recent disclosures from McDermott provide a good guide. Crucial to the continued ability of the firm to stay within its banking covenants and remain a going concern in the Q3 2018 results was the $300m in 12% preference shares sold by McDermott to Goldman Sachs and Company (and affiliated funds). From the sale McDermott received $289m, meaning Goldman banked $11m in fees… to start with… The kicker is that Goldman and its funds (likely credit opportunity funds managed by the bank) also ended up owning warrants to purchase 3.75% of MDR at .01 per share… at the time of pixel those options are worth ~$51.5m (at an MDR share price of c. $7.61).
If you don’t believe MDR is in real financial trouble you need to ask yourself why the best course of action for management was to engage in a financing that cost shareholders ~$62m to “borrow”/ strengthen their balance sheet (sic) to the tune of $300m. The $289m the company got has an interest cost of $36m per year (excluding tax effects) and cost the shareholders 3.75% of their company. No wonder the shares dropped ~40% when the news was announced (already well down on the pre-acquisition price): investors knew they were losing a lot more than 3.75% of the value of the company. Not only that the increased working capital lines ($230m) required that this capital went in. MDR had maxed its borrowing capacity just a few short months after the takeover. In short: it was a financial disaster.
This isn’t a rage against the Great Vampire Squid, because if you need to get your hands on $300m quickly, and you are running out of cash, then for a good reason money tends to be expensive. The real question is how MDR got here, and so quickly, since acquiring CBI?
In my view the short answer is: a total failure of governance from the MDR Board that allowed management to buy a much bigger business they knew literally nothing about. The famed “One McDermott Way” was about installing cheap pipe and jackets in the Middle East and Africa not building on-shore low-margin refining plants. It is about as relevant as an orange juice manufacturer buying Tesla because they are going to apply the lessons learned in de-pipping oranges to extending the battery life of electric-powered vehicles.
The failure of this deal will I believe lead to the end of the MDR offshore contracting business as an independent entity. The reason is nothing more than a failure to ask a basic and honest question about where the skills of the company reside? And for the Board to realise that for MDR management the worst option of being acquired was probably the best option for the shareholders.
This presentation given to shareholders in August indicates that shareholders already had a serious case of post-acquisition regret, and reading between the lines here management are clearly under huge pressure despite the upbeat tone of their communications. The 40% decline their investment post-August is likely to have induced a sense of humour failure amongst even their most loyal of followers. Someone senior is going to have to carry the can soon and that does not make for a harmonious exec. I can’t think of another M&A deal that has locked in such a loss of value so quickly.
McDermott got into this because in late 2017 their viability as an independent company looked shaky. Management had a very good offshore crises through a mix of skill and luck: their low-cost Middle Eastern model, not applicable when the Norwegians and French were in competition to build a more expensive OSV than the company before them, was more shallow-water focused than Brazil/UDW, and they didn’t have a complex about working old assets to death. McDermott picked up some cheap assets like the 105 when the opportunity presented itself, but management didn’t blow money on value dilutive acquisitions either or go to long on assets or debt. MDR management had steered the company back from the brink to create a genuinely competitive company with an ideal geographic footprint and asset base for the new offshore environment. I was a real admirer of the company.
But then GE started sounding out Subsea 7 (and being turned down), and the MDR footprint would have been perfect for Subsea 7 (BHGE would clearly have made a hash of MDR). There are very few companies the size of MDR that remain independent in an environment where consolidation is the market mantra: they had very little net debt, were big enough to buy and move the needle for a large company in revenue terms, but small enough to acquire in financing to terms. And there is some real intellectual and engineering skills in the core DNA of the McDermott business, no matter how complex the offshore problem, someone in McDermott knows the answer.
At some point in 2017 MDR management and the Giant Vampire Squid decided on a plan to buy CB&I and their shareholders really did think Christmas had come early that December 17th. To avoid being acquired McDermott opted for a type of ‘Pac Man’ defence: it went on to acquire a larger company. You can see the balance sheet of CB&I was substantially larger than MDR:
CBI Balance sheet:
MDR Balance Sheet:
Crudely MDR had $3.2 bn in assets and almost no debt while CB&I had $6bn in assets but $5.6bn in debt.
The reason MDR could do this was the debt and CB&I losses. CB&I was losing, and had been for a considerable period of time, vast amounts of money in its core business. A pretty crucial question would therefore be “could the One McDermott Way” transform this situation? A secondary question if the answer was yes was how much due diligence should be undertaken to prove this?
This isn’t hindsight talking. Here are the last four years financial performance of CBI:
Can any of you, even those without financial training, see something that might worry you about buying this company? (I’ll give you a clue it’s in the last line and it’s a material number). As Bloomberg noted at the time:
The problem with buying a larger company as a defence is its asymmetric returns: it is a leveraged bet on management and financial skill and if it goes wrong the value in the acquiring company is wiped out. And that unfortunately is what has happened here.
In case you were wondering the merger between MDR and CB&I consumed ~$300m in fees, slightly more in cash than McDermott later managed to raise from Goldman (and paid in cash of course), a symmetry in irony I am sure the bankers enjoyed.
And yet for the $300m in fees the due diligence didn’t uncover the cost overruns in the projects, and despite having three of the most illustrious banks on Wall Street: Goldman, Sachs, & Co, (lead adviser), Moelis & Co (advising on the financing only), Greenhill & Co (advising the Board of MDR) no one managed to ask: really, can we do this? And if they did, get the right answer!
But after the fees comes the interest bill… in cash and kind now… the hangover so to speak, and this one is mind-numbingly painful:
MDR Capital Structure
MDR are paying an interest bill (per annum) of: ~$90m for the Senior Loan, ~$138m for the notes, $36m for the preference shares (not included here), and the Amazon lease payments which must be ~$30m for a $345m vessel: ~$294m in total per year (say one Amazon per year at current build costs?). MDR only made an operating profit of $324m in 2017. In addition, the three CB&I projects they have taken a hit on will consume $425m in cash in 2019! So by the end of 2019 MDR will have spent ~$1bn in cash on deal fees, interest, and project costs. As someone nearly said “a billion here, and a billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money“.
All this talk of “synergies” is hokum. Everyone involved in projects knows that the pipeline fabricator in Dubai isn’t getting cheaper steel because MDR are losing money building an LNG train in Freeport. But the interest and fees are real cash. Maybe they will sell the non-core businesses and bring the debt pile down but it brings execution risk and no certainty the debt reduction will be proportionate. These asset sales have the feeling of looking for change down the back of the sofa as they were never announced as part of the original deal and the tanks business is a complex carve out that will involve vast consultants fees and by MDR’s own admission take at least nine month… on the other hand interest, like rust, never sleeps…
The fact is the reason the on-shore business of CB&I is structurally unprofitable is because despite the contract size and complexity there are a large number of equally competent (more so actually) companies who bid all the margin away. That’s no different to subsea but MDR had a genuine competitive advantage in that business and CB&I didn’t in on-shore (as their financials showed).
In really simple terms now McDermott must make a smaller offshore business, in very competitive market that consumes vast amounts of capital to grow; pay for a larger unprofitable onshore operation where management lack skills and knowledge. The odds of success must be seen as low? The square root of zero I would suggest. McDermott will be starved of CapEx as the CFO uses any cash he can to pay for the interest and charter commitments while trying to compete against onshore behemoths much larger in scale. Maintaining market share in offshore will be impressive, forget about growing it. And all this to feed a beast in a low margin onshore business that competes against giants like Fluor.
If the Board of McDermott took shareholder value seriously they would try to get Subsea 7 management back to the table and sell them the offshore business for a price close to what Subsea 7 were offering last year. The world has changed but the price for a trophy asset might still be good. What happens to the rump CB&I would be sold at auction, for probably not much, but such is reality. Such a scenario would yield more than letting this state of affairs continue.