Random weekend energy thoughts… Productivity, costs, and DSV asset values…

Permian shale and tight production in the third quarter was 338,000 barrels per day, representing an increase of 150,000 barrels per day. Let me say it again: this is up 80% relative to the same quarter last year. As many of you will realize, that’s the equivalent of adding a midsized Permian pure play E&P company in a matter of months.

Pat Yarrington, CFO, Chevron, on the Q3 2018 results call

John Howe from UT2 posted the photo above on Friday and kindly allowed me to reproduce the it. The Seawell cost £35m in 1987 and according to the Bank of England Inflation Calculator the same vessel would cost ~£94m in 2018 in real terms. In 1987 the USD/UK exchange rate was ~1.5 so the Seawell cost $53m and inflation adjusted around $132m (at current exchange rates).

Compare that with the most recent numbers we have for a new Dive Support Vessel (“DSV”) of a similar spec: the Vard 801 ex Haldane that was contracted at $165m (sold for $105m).  That price is roughly 25% above the cost of the Seawell in real terms. You get a better crane and lower fuel consumption but in productive terms you can still only dive to 300m (and no riser tower) and I doubt the crane and the lower fuel consumption are worth paying 25% more in capital terms.

These prices don’t reflect how much the MV Seawell pushed the technological boundary when she was built when and recognised as one of the most sophisticated vessels in the world. The major £60m/$75m upgrade she received in 2014 highlights again the myth that old tonnage will naturally be scrapped as an iron cast law is wrong, but more importantly highlights the technical specification of the vessel has always been above even a high-end construction class DSV (clearly visible in the photo the riser tower must have been seen a major technological innovation in 1987) and yet it is more economic to upgrade than build new for a core North Sea well intervention and dive asset. Helix has invested in an asset that brings the benefits of low-cost from a different cost era to a new more uncertain environment.

The reasons for price inflation in OSVs are well-known and I have discussed this before (here): offshore vessels are custom designed and have a high labour content which is not subject to the same produtivity improvements and lower overall cost reduction that manufactured goods have (Baumol Cost Disease). The DP system and engine might have come down in real terms, but the dive systems certainly haven’t. Even getting hulls built in Eastern Europe and finished in Norway has not reduced the cost of new OSVs in real terms (you only have to look at Vard’s financial numbers to see the answer isn’t in shipbuilding being a structurally more profitable industry).

That sort of structural cost inflation, a hallmark of the great offshore boom of 2003-2014, was fine when there was no substitute product for offshore oil. Very few OSVs were built in a series (apart from some PSV and AHTS). But the majority of the vessels were one-off or customised designs with enormous amounts of time from ship designers, naval architects, class auditors (i.e. labour) before you even got to the fit-out stage. Structural inflation became built into the industry with day-rates in charters etc expected to go up even as assets aged and depreciated in real economic terms because demand was outpacing the ability of yards to supply the tonnage as needed.

The same cost explosion happened in pipelay but did allow buyers to access deeper water projects. Between 2003-2014 an enormous number of deepwater rigid-reel pipelay vessels were built (in a relative sense) with each new vessel having even more top tension etc. than the last; but the parameters were essentially the same: they were just seeking to push the boundary of the same engineering constraints. The result was (again) a vast increase in real costs but one that was partially offset by advances in new pipe and riser technology that allowed uneconomic fields to be developed. Now Airborne and Magma are working on solutions that could make many of these assets redundant. Only time will tell if those offshore companies who have made vast investments in pipelay vessels will have to sell them at marginal cost to compete with composite pipe if the solution gets large-scale operator acceptance (i.e. Petrobras). However, if composite pipe and risers get accepted by E&P companies on a commercial scale those deepwater lay assets are worth substantially less than book value would imply (I actually think the most likely scenario is a gradual erosion of the fleet as it is not replaced).

But now there is a competitor to offshore production: shale. And it is clearly taking investment at the margin from offshore oil and gas. And shale production is an industry subject to vast economies of scale and productivity improvements. The latest Chevron results make clear that they have built a vast, and economically viable, shale business that added 150k barrels per day of production at an 80% growth rate year-on-year:

Chevron Q3 2018 Permian .png

To put that in perspective when Siccar Point gets the Cambo field up and going they will be at 15k per day and it will have taken them years (and the point is they are a quality firm with Blackstone/Bluewater as investors ensuring the do not face a financing constraint).

What makes shale economic is the vast economies of scale and scope available to companies like Chevron. E&P companies producing shale are adding vast amounts of production volume every year and theories that they are not making money doing this are starting to sound like Moon photo hoax stories. E&P companies throw money and technology at a known geological formation and it delivers oil. The more money they invest the lower the unit costs become and the greater the economics of learning and innovation they can apply at even greater scale.

Offshore has a place but it needs to match the productivity benefits offered by shale because it is at a disadvantage in terms of capital flexibility and time to payback.The cost reductions in offshore that have been driven by excess capacity and an investment boom hangover, these are not sustainable and replicable advantages. In offshore everything, from the rig to well design and subsea production system, has traditionally been custom designed (or had a significant amount of rework per development). When people talk of “advantaged” offshore oil now it generally means either a) a field close to existing infrastructure, or, b) a find so big it is worth the enormous development cost. Either of those factors allow a productivity benefit that allows these fields to compete with onshore investment. But to pretend all known or unknown offshore reserves are equal in this regard is ignoring the evidence that offshore will be a far more selective investment for E&P companies and capital markets.

One of the reasons I don’t take seriously graphs like this:


…and their accompanying “supply shortage” scare stories is that the market and price mechanism have a remarkably good track record at delivering supply at an economically viable price (since like the dawn of capitalism in Mesopotamia). Modelling the sort of productivity and output benefits that E&P majors are coming up with at the moment is an issue fraught with risk because 1 or 2% compounded over a long period of time is a very large number.

As an immediate contra you get this today for example:

(Reuters) – The oil market’s two-year bull run is running into one of its biggest tests in months, facing a tidal wave of supply and growing worries about economic weakness sapping demand worldwide.

Which brings us back to DSVs in the North Sea, their asset values, and the question of whether you would commission a new one at current prices?

Last week the OGA published an excellent report on wells in the UK and its grim for the future of UK subsea, but especially for the core brownfield and greenfield projects in shallow water that DSVs specialised in. And without a CapEx boom there won’t be a utilisation boom:

OGA wells summary 2-18.png

Future drilling is expected to pick-up  mildly, although it is unfunded, but look at this:

EA well spud.png

Development Drilling.png

So the only area in the UKCS that isn’t in long-term decline is West-of Shetland which is not a DSV area. CNS and SNS were the great DSV development and maintenance areas and the decline in activity in those areas are a structural phenomena that looks unlikely to change. Any pickup is rig work is years away from translating into a Capex boom that would change the profitability of the UKCS DSV and small project fleet.

DSV driven projects have become economic in the North Sea because they are being sold well below their economic cost. Such a situation is unsustainable in the long run (particularly as the offshore assets have a very high running cost). The UKCS isn’t getting a productivity boom like shale to cover the increased costs of specialist assets like DSVs and rigs: E&P companies are merely taking advantage of a supply overhang from an investment boom. That is no sustainable for either party.

So while the period 2003-2014 was “The Great Offshore Boom” the period 2015-2025 is likely to be “The Great Rebalancing” where supply and demand both contract to meet at an equilibrium point. Supply will have to contract because at the moment it is helping to make projects economic by selling DSVs below their true economic worth, and the number of projects will have to contract eventually because that situation won’t last. E&P companies will need to pay higher rates and that will simply make less projects viable. You can clearly see from the historic drilling data that a project boom in shallow water must be a long time coming given the lags between drilling and final investment decisions.

The weak link here in the North Sea DSV market is clearly Bibby Offshore (surely soon to be branded as Rever Offshore?). As the most marginal player it is the most at risk as marginal demand shrinks. Bibby, like other DSV operators on the UKCS, serves an E&P community that is facing declining productivity relative to shale (and therefore a higher cost of capital), in a declining basin, where the cost of their DSVs is not reducing proportionately or offering increased productivity terms to cover this gap. Both Technip and Boskalis were able to buy assets at below economic cost to reduce this structural gap but the York led recapitalisation of Bibby still seems to significantly over value the Polaris and the Sapphire – particularly given implied DSV values with the Technip purchase of the Vard 801 (TBN: Deep Discovery).

DSVs made the UKCS viable and built the core infrastructure, but they did it in a rising price environment where the market was based on a fear of a lack of supply. One reason no new North Sea class DSVs were built between 1999 the Bibby Sapphire conversion in 2005 is because the price of oil declined in real terms but the price of a DSV increased meaningfully in real terms. A new generation of West of Shetland projects may keep the North Sea alive for a while longer but this work will be ROV led. A number of brownfield developments and maintenance work may keep certain “advantaged” fields going for years that will require a declining number of DSVs.

North Sea class DSV sales prices for DSVs are adjusting to their actual economic value it would appear not just reflecting a short-term market aberration.

#structural_change #this_time_it_is_different #supplymustequaldemand

DSV valuations in an uncertain world: Love isn’t all you need… Credible commitment is more important…

“Residual valuation in shipping and offshore scares the shit out of me”

Investment Banker in a recent conversation


“Alice laughed: “There’s no use trying,” she said; “one can’t believe impossible things.” “I daresay you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was younger, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.”


The FT recently published this Short View about how the bottom may have been reached for rig companies and that there may be upside from here. The first thing I noted was how high rig utilisation was, the OSV fleet would kill for that level, and yet still the fleet is struggling to maintain profitability (graph not in the electronic edition but currently about 65%). The degree of operational leverage is a sign of how broken the risk model is for the offshore sector as a whole. A correction will be needed going forward for new investment in kit going forward and the obvious point to meet is in contract length. Banks simply are not going to lend $500m on a rig that will be going on a three year contract. Multi- operator, longer-term, contracts will be the norm to get to 7G rigs I suspect (no one needs to make a 6G rig ever again I suspect). The article states:

No wonder. Daily rental rates for even the most sophisticated deepwater rigs have tumbled 70 per cent, back to prices not seen since 2004. Miserly capital spending by the major oil companies, down more than half to $40bn in the two years to 2016, has not helped. Adding to this lack of investment from its customers is a bubble of new builds, which is only slowly deflating.

Understandably, the market is showing little faith in the underlying value of these rig operators. US and Norwegian operators trade at just 20 per cent of their stated book values. The market value of US-listed Atwood Oceanics suggests its rigs are worth no more than its constituent steel, according to Fearnley Securities.

What the article doesn’t make clear, but every OSV investor understands, is that in order to access more than the value of the steel rigs and OSVs have very high running costs. The market is making a logical discount because if you cannot fund the OpEx until operating it above cash break even or a sale then steel is all you will get: it’s the liquidity discount to a solvency problem. That tension between future realisable value and the option value/cost of getting there is at the core of current valuation problems.

The OSV fleet is struggling with utilisation levels that are well under 50% for most asset classes and even some relatively new vessels (Seven Navica) are so unsellable (to E&P customers I don’t think Subsea 7 is a seller of the asset) they have been laid-up.  From a valuation perspective nothing intrigues me more than the North Sea DSV fleet: The global fleet is limited to between 18-24 vessels, depending on how your criteria, and with a limited number companies who can utilise the vessels, they provide a near perfect natural experiment for asset prices in an illiquid market.

North Sea class DSVs need to be valued from an Asset Specific perspective: in economic terms this means the value of the asset declines significantly when the DSV leaves the North Sea region. Economists define this risk as “Hold Up” risk. In both the BOHL and Harkand/Nor case this risk was passed to bondholders, owners of fixed debt obligations with no managerial involvement in the business and few contractual obligations as to how the business was run.

The question, as both companies face fundraising challenges, is what are the DSVs worth? Is there an “price” for the asset unique from the structure that allows it to operate?

In the last BOHL accounts (30 June 2017) the value of the Polaris and Sapphire is £74m. I am sure there is a reputable broker who has given them this number, on a willing buyer/ willing seller basis. The problem of course is that in a distress situation, and when you are going through cash at c.£1m per week and you have less than £7m left it is a distress capital raise, what is a willing seller? No one I know in the shipbroking community really believes they could get £74m for those vessels and indeed if they could they bondholders should jump at the chance of a near 40% recovery of par. A fire-sale would bring a figure a quantum below this.

Sapphire is the harder of the two assets to value: the vessel is in lay-up, has worked less than 20 days this year, and despite being the best DSV in the Gulf of Mexico hasn’t allowed BOHL to develop meaningful market share (which is why the Nor Da Vinci going to Trinidad needs to be kept in context). Let’s assume that 1/3 of the £74m is the Sapphire… How do you justify £24m for a vessel that cannot even earn its OpEx and indeed has so little work the best option is warm-stack? The running costs on these sort of vessels is close to £10k per day normally, over 10% of the capital value of the asset not including a dry dock allowance etc? Moving the vessel back to the North Sea would cost $500k including fuel.  The only answer is potential future residual value. If BOHL really believed the asset was worth £24m they should have approached the bondholders and agreed a proportionate writedown and sold the asset… but I think everyone knows that the asset is essentially unsellable in the current market, and certainly for nowhere near the number book value implies. Vard, Keppel, and China Merchants certainly do… The only recent DSV sale was the Swiber Atlantis that had a broker valuation of USD 40-44m in 2014 and went for c. USD 10m to NPCC and that was not an anomaly on recent transaction multiples. If the Sapphire isn’t purchased as part of a broader asset purchase she may not return to the North Sea and her value is extremely uncertain – see how little work the Swordfish has had.

Polaris has a different, but related, valuation problem. In order to access the North Sea day rate that would make the vessel worth say a £50m valuation you need a certain amount of infrastructure and that costs at c.£5-8m per annum (c.£14k -22k per day), and that is way above the margin one of two DSVs is making yet you are exposed to the running costs of £10k per day. Utilisation for the BOHL fleet has been between 29%-46% this year and the market is primarily spot with little forward commitment from the customer base. So an investor is being asked to go long on a £50m asset, with high OpEx and infrastructure requirements, and no backlog and a market upturn needed as well? In order to invest in a proposition like that you normally need increasing returns to scale not decreasing returns that a depreciable asset offers you.

This link between the asset specificity of DSV and the complementary nature of the infrastructure required to support it is the core valuation of these assets. Ignoring the costs of the support infrastructure from the ability of the asset to generate the work is like doing a DCF valuation of a company and then forgetting to subtract the debt obligation from the implied equity value: without the ability to trade in the North Sea the asset must compete in the rest-of-the-world market, and apart from a bigger crane and deck-space the vessels have no advantage.

It is this inability to see this, and refusal to accept that because of this there is no spot market for North Sea class DSVs, that has led to the Nor position in my humble opinion. The shareholders of the vessels are caught in the irreconcilable position of wanting the vessels to be valued at a “North Sea Price”, but unable or unwilling to commit to the expenditure to make this credible. It would of course be economic madness to do so, but it’s just as mad to pretend that without doing so the values might revert to the historically implied levels of depreciated book value.

The Nor owners issued a prospectus as part of the capital raising in Nov 2016 and made clear the running costs of the vessels were c. USD 370k per month per vessel for crewing and c. USD 90k per month for SAT system maintenance. In their last accounts they claimed the vessels value at c. USD 60m each. Given Nor raised USD 15m in Nov last year, and expected to have one vessel on a 365 contract ay US 15k per day by March, they are so far behind this they cannot catch-up at current market rates.

Again, these vessels, even at the book values registered, require more than 10% of their capital value annually just to keep the option alive of capturing that value. That is a very expensive option when the payoff is so uncertain. If you are out on your assumption of the final sale value by 10% then you have wasted an entire year’s option premium and on a discounted basis hugely diluted your potential returns (i.e. this is very risky). Supposedly 25 year assets you spend more than 2.5x their asset values to keep the residual value option alive.

Three factors are crucial for the valuation of these assets:

  • The gap between the present earning potential and the possible future value is speculation. You can craft an extremely complicated investment thesis but it’s just a hypothesis. The “sellers” of these assets, unsurprisingly, believe they hold something of great future value the market simply doesn’t recognise at the moment. Sometimes this goes right, as it did for John Paulson in the subprime mortgage market (in this case a short position obviously) and other times it didn’t as owners of Mississippi Company shares found to their discomfort. We are back to the “Greater Fool Theory” of DSV valuation.One share.png
  • Debt: In the good old days you could finance these assets with debt so the equity check, certainly relative to the risk was small. In reality now, for all but the most blue-chip borrowers, bank loan books are closed for such specialist assets. And the problem is the blue-chip borrowers have (more than) enough DSVs. The Bibby and Nor DSVs are becoming old vessels: Polaris (1999) will never get a loan against it again I would venture and the Sapphire (2005) has the same problem. The Nor vessels are 2011 builds and are very close to the 8 year threshold of most shipping banks. As a general rule, like a house, if you can’t get a mortgage the vessel is worth less, substantially so in these cases because all diving companies are making less money so their ability to find equity for vessels is reduced. Banks and other lenders have worked out that the price volatility on these assets is huge and the only thing more unsellable that a new DSV is an old DSV. It will take a generation for internal risk models to reset.
  • You need a large amount of liquidity to signal that you have the commitment to see this through. At the moment neither Bibby or Nor have this. From easily obtainable public information any potential counterparty can see a far more rational strategy is to wait, the choice of substitutes is large and the problems of the seller greater than your potential upside.

Of course, the answer to liquidity concerns, as any central banker since Bagehot has realised, is to flood the market with liquidity. Bibby Line Group for example could remove their restrictions on the RCF and simply say they have approved it (quite why Barclays will agree to this arrangement is beyond me: the reputational risk for them foreclosing is huge). As the shareholder Bibby Line Group could tell the market what they are doing, in Mario Monti’s words, “whatever it takes”. Of course, Mario Monti can print “high powered money” which is not something Bibby Line Group can, and that credibility deficit is well understood by the market. A central bank cannot go bankrupt (and here) whereas a commitment from BLG to underwrite BOHL to the tune of £62m per annum would threaten the financial position of the parent.

I have a theory, untestable in a statistically significant sense but seemingly observable (e.g. Standard Drilling, the rig market in general), that excessive liquidity, especially among alternative asset managers and special situation funds, is destroying the price discovery mechanism in oil and gas (and probably other markets as well).  I accept that this maybe because I am excessively pessimistic, but when your entire gamble is on residual value in an oversupplied market, how can you not be? In offshore this is plain to see as the Nor buyers again work out how to value the assets for their second “super senior” or is that “super super senior” tranche, or however they plan to fund their ongoing operations. The Bibby question will have to be resolved imminently.

At some point potential investors will have the revolutionary notion that the assets should be valued under reasonable cash flow assumptions that reflect the huge increase in supply of the competitive asset base and lower demand volumes. Such a price is substantially lower than build cost, and therein lies the correction mechanism because new assets will not be built, in the North Sea DSV case for a considerable period of time. Both the Bibby and the Nor bondholders, possessors of theoretically fixed payment obligations secured on illiquid and specialised assets will be key to the market correction. Yes this value is likely to be substantially below implied book/depreciated value… but that is the price signal not to build any more! Economics is a brutal discipline as well as a dismal one (and clearly not one Chinese yards have encountered much).

How these existing assets are financed will provide an insight into the current market “price discovery” mechanism. For Nor the percentage of the asset effectively that the new cash demands, and the fixed rate of return for further liquidity, will highlight a degree of market pessimism or optimism over the future residual value. If you have to supply another USD 15m to keep the two vessels in the spot charter market for another 12 or 15 months how much asset exposure do you need to make it work? Will the Nor vessels really be worth $60m in a few years if you have to spend USD 7.5 per annum to realize that? What IRR do you require on the $7.5m to take that risk? Somewhere between the pessimism of poor historic utilisation and declining structural conditions and the inherent liquidity and optimism of the distressed debt investors lies a deal.

The Bibby valuation is more binary: either the company raises capital that sees the assets tied to the frameworks of their infrastructure, and implicit cross-subsidisation of both, or the assets are exposed to the pure vessel sale and purchase market. The latter scenario will see a brutal price discovery mechanism as industrial buyers alone will be the bidders I suspect.

Shipbroker valuations work well for liquid markets. The brokers have a very good knowledge of what buyers and sellers are willing to pay and I believe they are accurate. I have severe doubts for illiquid markets, particularly those erring down, that brokers, like rating agencies, have the right economic incentives to provide a broad enough range of the possibilities.

Although the question regarding the North Sea DSVs wasn’t rhetorical it is clear what I think: unless you are prepared to commit to the North Sea in a credible manner a North Sea DSV is worth only what it can earn in the rest-of-the-world with maybe a small option premium in case the market booms and the very long run nature of the supply curve. The longer this doesn’t happen the less that option is valued at and the more expensive it is to keep.


[P.S. Around Bishopsgate there is a theory circulating that Blogs can have a disproportionate impact on DSV values a theory only the most paranoid and delusional could subscribe to. I have therefore chosen to ignore this at the present time. The substance of the message is more important than the form or location of its delivery.]

Diverging results point to the future of offshore… procyclicality reverses…

Colin, for example, has recently persuaded himself that the propensity to consume in terms of money is constant at all phases of the credit cycle.  He works out a figure for it and proposes to predict by using the result, regardless of the fact that his own investigations clearly show that it is not constant, in addition to the strong a priori reasons for regarding it as most unlikely that it can be so.

The point needs emphasising because the art of thinking in terms of models is a difficult–largely because it is an unaccustomed–practice. The pseudo-analogy with the physical sciences leads directly counter to the habit of mind which is most important for an economist proper to acquire…

One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as constant and homogeneous in the same way that the material of the other sciences, in spite of its complexity, is constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground depended on the apple’s motives, on whether it is worth while falling to the ground, and whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, and on mistaken calculations on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the centre of the earth.

Keynes to Harrod, 1938


A, having one hundred pounds stock in trade, though pretty much in debt, gives it out to be worth three hundred pounds, on account of many privileges and advantages to which he is entitled. B, relying on A’s great wisdom and integrity, sues to be admitted partner on those terms, and accordingly buys three hundred pounds into the partnership.The trade being afterwords given out or discovered to be very improving, C comes in at fivehundred pounds; and afterwards D, at one thousand one hundred pounds. And the capital is then completed to two thousand pounds. If the partnership had gone no further than A and B, then A had got and B had lost one hundred pounds. If it had stopped at C, then A had got and C had lost two hundred pounds; and B had been where he was before: but D also coming in, A gains four hundred pounds, and B two hundred pounds; and C neither gains nor loses: but D loses six hundred pounds. Indeed, if A could show that the said capital was intrinsicallyworth four thousand and four hundred pounds, there would be no harm done to D; and B and C would have been obliged to him. But if the capital at first was worth but one hundred pounds, and increasedonly by subsequent partnership, it must then be acknowl-edged that B and C have been imposed on in their turns, and that unfortunate thoughtless D paid the piper.
A Adamson (1787) A History of Commerce (referring to the South Sea Bubble)

The Bank of England has defined procyclicality as follows:

  • First, in the short term, as the tendency to invest in a way that exacerbates market movements and contributes to asset price volatility, which can in turn contribute to asset price feedback loops. Asset price volatility has the potential to affect participants across financial markets, as well as to have longer-term macroeconomic effects; and
  • Second, in the medium term, as a tendency to invest in line with asset price and economic cycles, so that willingness to bear risk diminishes in periods of stress and increases in upturns.

Everyone is offshore recognises these traits: as the oil price rose and E&P companies started reporting record results offshore contractors had record profits. Contractors and E&P comapnies both began an investment boom, highly correlated, and on the back of this banks extended vast quantities of credit to both parties, when even the banks started getting nervous the high-yield market willingly obliged with even more credit to offshore contractors. And then the price of oil crashed an a dramatically different investment environment began.

What is procyclical on the way up with a debt boom always falls harder on the way down as a countercyclical reaction, and now the E&P companies are used to a capital light approach this is the new norm for offshore. The problem in macroeconomic terms, as I constantly repeat here, is that debt is an obligation fixed in constant numbers and as the second point above makes clear that in periods of stress for offshore contracting, such as now, the willingness to bear risk is low. Contractors with high leverage levels that required the industry to be substantially bigger cannot survive financially with new lower demand levels.

I mention this because the end of the asset bubble has truly been marked this week by the diverging results between the E&P companies and some of the large contractors. All the supermajors are now clearly a viable entities at USD 50 a barrel whereas the same cannot be said for offshore rig and vessel contractors who still face large over capacity issues.

This chart from Saipem nicely highlights the problem the offshore industry has:

Saipem backlog H1 2017 €mn

Saipem backlog Hi 2017.png

Not only has backlog in offshore Engineering and Construction dropped 13% but Saipem are working through it pretty quickly with new business at c.66% of revenues. The implication clearly being that there is a business here just 1/3 smaller than the current one. You can see why Subsea 7 worked so hard to buy the EMAS Chiyoda backlog because they added only $141m organically in Q2 with almost no new deepwater projects announced in the quarter.

It is not that industry conditions are “challenging” but clearly the industry is undergoing a secular shift to being a much smaller part of the investment profile for E&P companies and therefore a much smaller industry as the market is permanently contracting as this profile of Shell capex shows:

Shell Capex 2017

A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you are talking real money. The FT had a good article this week that highlighted how “Big Oil” are adapating to lower costs, and its all bad for the offshore supply chain:

The first six months of this year saw 15 large conventional upstream oil and gas projects given the green light, with reserves of about 8bn barrels of oil and oil equivalent, according to WoodMac. This compared with 12 projects approved in the whole of 2016, containing about 8.8bn barrels. However, activity remains far below the average 40 new developments approved annually between 2007 and 2013 and, with crude prices yo-yoing around $50 per barrel, analysts say the economics of conventional projects remain precarious.

Not all of these are offshore but the offshore supply chain built capacity for this demand and in fact more because utilisation was already slipping in 2014. And this statistic should terrify the offshore industry:

WoodMac says that half of all greenfield conventional projects awaiting a green light would not achieve a 15 per cent return on investment at long-term oil prices of $60 per barrel, raising “serious doubt” over their prospects for development. By this measure, there is twice as much undeveloped US shale oil capable of making money at $60 per barrel than there is conventional resources.

The backlog (or lack of) is the most worrying aspect for the financing of the whole industry. E&P companies have laid off so many engineers and slowed down so many FIDs that even if the price of oil jumped to $100 tomorrow (and no one believes that) it would take years to ramp up project delivery capacity anyway. Saipem and Subsea 7 are not exceptions they are large companies that highlight likely future work indicates that asset values at current levels may not be an anamoly for vessel and rig owners but the “new normal” as part of “lower for longer”.

I recently spoke to a senior E&P financier in Houston who is convinced “the man from Oaklahoma” is right but only because he thinks overcapacity will keep prices low: c. 50% of fracing costs come from sand, which isn’t subject to productivity improvements, and he is picking that low prices eventually catch up with the prices being paid for land. I still think that the more large E&P companies focus on improving efficiency will ensure this remains a robust source of production given their productivity improvements as Chevron’s results showed:

Chevron Permian Productivity 2017

Large oil came to the North Sea and turned it into a leading technical development centre for the rest of the world. Brazil would not be possible without the skills and competencies (e.g. HPHT) developed by the supermajors in the North Sea and I think once these same companies start focusing their R&D efforts on shale productivity will continue to increase and this will be at the expense of offshore.

It is now very clear that the supermajors, who count for the majority of complex deepwater developments that are the users of high-end vessel capacity, are very comfortable with current economic conditions. They have no incentive to binge on CapEx because even if prices go up rapidly that just means they can pay for it with current cash flow.

That means the ‘Demand Fairy’ isn’t saving anyone here and that asset values are probably a fair reflection of their economic earning potential. Now the process between banks and offshore contractors has become one of counter-cyclicality where the asset price-feedback loop is working in reverse: banks will not lend on offshore assets because no one knows (or wants to believe) the current values and therefore there are no transactions beyond absolute distress sales. This model has been well understood by economists modelling contracting credit and asset values:

Asset Prices and Credit Contracttion

Getting banks to allocate capital to offshore in the future will be very hard given the risk models used and historical losses. Offshore assets will clearly be subject to the self referencing model above.

I remain convinced that European banks and investors are doing a poor job compared to US investors about accepting the scale of their loss and the need for the industry to have significantly less capital and asset value than it does now. Too many investors thought this downturn was like 2007/08, when there was a quick rebound, and while this smoothed asset prices somewhat on the way down this cash was used mainly for liquidity, it is now running dry and not more will be available (e.e. Nor Offshore) at anything other than penal terms given the uncertainty. Until backlog is meaningfully added across the industry asset values should, in a rational world, remain extremely depressed and I believe they will.