Hindsight Offshore: McDermott Amazon

Way back in February 2017 I asked how good a deal McDermott buying the Amazon really was?

Here is the answer in their latest results… and it is that it was not that good a deal:

On July 27, 2018, we entered into agreements (the “Amazon Modification Agreements”) providing for certain modifications to the Amazon vessel and related financing and amended bareboat charter arrangements. The total cost of the modifications, including project management and other fees and expenses, is expected to be in the range of approximately $260 million to $290 million.

So they got a deepwater lay vessel finally for $310-345m including the initial purchase price. I would say Saipem got a much better deal on the Constellation (€250m) if they can ever get any work for it (and given their strained relations with Aker on North Sea work the real winner in that deal were the banks).

McDermott face trying to break into the UDW installation market with that asset in order to have any hope of recouping that level of investment, and although they have vast technical expertise the fact is most of it is in shallower water, and the only way someone is going to hire them for UDW work is for them to be cheap. SS7, Technip FMC, and Saipem all have substantial excess capacity in this regard. Entering this market will also require vast amounts of working capital, something McDermott clearly lacks at the moment. They are going to have to take delivery of the new vessel and associated kit in an oversupplied market with no backlog of note with the only certainty being the lease payments on a ~300m worth of kit (and use this to fund a loss making onshore construction business).

The Winners Curse.

Increasing US oil production… Just like the man said…

[P]rogress in science is not a simple line leading to the truth. It is more progress away from less adequate conceptions of, and interactions with, the world.

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Some excellent data from the EIA this week confirmed that US production, even with the known Permian constraint issues, is powering ahead and is excess of previous forecast levels. My hypothesis, hardly controversial, is that there is a strong negative correlation between these graphs and offshore vessel values.

This is playing out almost exactly as Spencer Dale predicted in 2015. This is a generational change in oil production that is clearly going to impact on any “offshore recovery” theory… some of which are starting to sound a little desperate and absurd. I have referenced the Spencer Dale article before and if you are looking for a unifying theory of why any offshore recovery is likely to be delayed and anemic I think it is still the most relevant and lucid explanation.

Random weekend energy thoughts… Productivity, costs, and DSV asset values…

Permian shale and tight production in the third quarter was 338,000 barrels per day, representing an increase of 150,000 barrels per day. Let me say it again: this is up 80% relative to the same quarter last year. As many of you will realize, that’s the equivalent of adding a midsized Permian pure play E&P company in a matter of months.

Pat Yarrington, CFO, Chevron, on the Q3 2018 results call

John Howe from UT2 posted the photo above on Friday and kindly allowed me to reproduce the it. The Seawell cost £35m in 1987 and according to the Bank of England Inflation Calculator the same vessel would cost ~£94m in 2018 in real terms. In 1987 the USD/UK exchange rate was ~1.5 so the Seawell cost $53m and inflation adjusted around $132m (at current exchange rates).

Compare that with the most recent numbers we have for a new Dive Support Vessel (“DSV”) of a similar spec: the Vard 801 ex Haldane that was contracted at $165m (sold for $105m).  That price is roughly 25% above the cost of the Seawell in real terms. You get a better crane and lower fuel consumption but in productive terms you can still only dive to 300m (and no riser tower) and I doubt the crane and the lower fuel consumption are worth paying 25% more in capital terms.

These prices don’t reflect how much the MV Seawell pushed the technological boundary when she was built when and recognised as one of the most sophisticated vessels in the world. The major £60m/$75m upgrade she received in 2014 highlights again the myth that old tonnage will naturally be scrapped as an iron cast law is wrong, but more importantly highlights the technical specification of the vessel has always been above even a high-end construction class DSV (clearly visible in the photo the riser tower must have been seen a major technological innovation in 1987) and yet it is more economic to upgrade than build new for a core North Sea well intervention and dive asset. Helix has invested in an asset that brings the benefits of low-cost from a different cost era to a new more uncertain environment.

The reasons for price inflation in OSVs are well-known and I have discussed this before (here): offshore vessels are custom designed and have a high labour content which is not subject to the same produtivity improvements and lower overall cost reduction that manufactured goods have (Baumol Cost Disease). The DP system and engine might have come down in real terms, but the dive systems certainly haven’t. Even getting hulls built in Eastern Europe and finished in Norway has not reduced the cost of new OSVs in real terms (you only have to look at Vard’s financial numbers to see the answer isn’t in shipbuilding being a structurally more profitable industry).

That sort of structural cost inflation, a hallmark of the great offshore boom of 2003-2014, was fine when there was no substitute product for offshore oil. Very few OSVs were built in a series (apart from some PSV and AHTS). But the majority of the vessels were one-off or customised designs with enormous amounts of time from ship designers, naval architects, class auditors (i.e. labour) before you even got to the fit-out stage. Structural inflation became built into the industry with day-rates in charters etc expected to go up even as assets aged and depreciated in real economic terms because demand was outpacing the ability of yards to supply the tonnage as needed.

The same cost explosion happened in pipelay but did allow buyers to access deeper water projects. Between 2003-2014 an enormous number of deepwater rigid-reel pipelay vessels were built (in a relative sense) with each new vessel having even more top tension etc. than the last; but the parameters were essentially the same: they were just seeking to push the boundary of the same engineering constraints. The result was (again) a vast increase in real costs but one that was partially offset by advances in new pipe and riser technology that allowed uneconomic fields to be developed. Now Airborne and Magma are working on solutions that could make many of these assets redundant. Only time will tell if those offshore companies who have made vast investments in pipelay vessels will have to sell them at marginal cost to compete with composite pipe if the solution gets large-scale operator acceptance (i.e. Petrobras). However, if composite pipe and risers get accepted by E&P companies on a commercial scale those deepwater lay assets are worth substantially less than book value would imply (I actually think the most likely scenario is a gradual erosion of the fleet as it is not replaced).

But now there is a competitor to offshore production: shale. And it is clearly taking investment at the margin from offshore oil and gas. And shale production is an industry subject to vast economies of scale and productivity improvements. The latest Chevron results make clear that they have built a vast, and economically viable, shale business that added 150k barrels per day of production at an 80% growth rate year-on-year:

Chevron Q3 2018 Permian .png

To put that in perspective when Siccar Point gets the Cambo field up and going they will be at 15k per day and it will have taken them years (and the point is they are a quality firm with Blackstone/Bluewater as investors ensuring the do not face a financing constraint).

What makes shale economic is the vast economies of scale and scope available to companies like Chevron. E&P companies producing shale are adding vast amounts of production volume every year and theories that they are not making money doing this are starting to sound like Moon photo hoax stories. E&P companies throw money and technology at a known geological formation and it delivers oil. The more money they invest the lower the unit costs become and the greater the economics of learning and innovation they can apply at even greater scale.

Offshore has a place but it needs to match the productivity benefits offered by shale because it is at a disadvantage in terms of capital flexibility and time to payback.The cost reductions in offshore that have been driven by excess capacity and an investment boom hangover, these are not sustainable and replicable advantages. In offshore everything, from the rig to well design and subsea production system, has traditionally been custom designed (or had a significant amount of rework per development). When people talk of “advantaged” offshore oil now it generally means either a) a field close to existing infrastructure, or, b) a find so big it is worth the enormous development cost. Either of those factors allow a productivity benefit that allows these fields to compete with onshore investment. But to pretend all known or unknown offshore reserves are equal in this regard is ignoring the evidence that offshore will be a far more selective investment for E&P companies and capital markets.

One of the reasons I don’t take seriously graphs like this:


…and their accompanying “supply shortage” scare stories is that the market and price mechanism have a remarkably good track record at delivering supply at an economically viable price (since like the dawn of capitalism in Mesopotamia). Modelling the sort of productivity and output benefits that E&P majors are coming up with at the moment is an issue fraught with risk because 1 or 2% compounded over a long period of time is a very large number.

As an immediate contra you get this today for example:

(Reuters) – The oil market’s two-year bull run is running into one of its biggest tests in months, facing a tidal wave of supply and growing worries about economic weakness sapping demand worldwide.

Which brings us back to DSVs in the North Sea, their asset values, and the question of whether you would commission a new one at current prices?

Last week the OGA published an excellent report on wells in the UK and its grim for the future of UK subsea, but especially for the core brownfield and greenfield projects in shallow water that DSVs specialised in. And without a CapEx boom there won’t be a utilisation boom:

OGA wells summary 2-18.png

Future drilling is expected to pick-up  mildly, although it is unfunded, but look at this:

EA well spud.png

Development Drilling.png

So the only area in the UKCS that isn’t in long-term decline is West-of Shetland which is not a DSV area. CNS and SNS were the great DSV development and maintenance areas and the decline in activity in those areas are a structural phenomena that looks unlikely to change. Any pickup is rig work is years away from translating into a Capex boom that would change the profitability of the UKCS DSV and small project fleet.

DSV driven projects have become economic in the North Sea because they are being sold well below their economic cost. Such a situation is unsustainable in the long run (particularly as the offshore assets have a very high running cost). The UKCS isn’t getting a productivity boom like shale to cover the increased costs of specialist assets like DSVs and rigs: E&P companies are merely taking advantage of a supply overhang from an investment boom. That is no sustainable for either party.

So while the period 2003-2014 was “The Great Offshore Boom” the period 2015-2025 is likely to be “The Great Rebalancing” where supply and demand both contract to meet at an equilibrium point. Supply will have to contract because at the moment it is helping to make projects economic by selling DSVs below their true economic worth, and the number of projects will have to contract eventually because that situation won’t last. E&P companies will need to pay higher rates and that will simply make less projects viable. You can clearly see from the historic drilling data that a project boom in shallow water must be a long time coming given the lags between drilling and final investment decisions.

The weak link here in the North Sea DSV market is clearly Bibby Offshore (surely soon to be branded as Rever Offshore?). As the most marginal player it is the most at risk as marginal demand shrinks. Bibby, like other DSV operators on the UKCS, serves an E&P community that is facing declining productivity relative to shale (and therefore a higher cost of capital), in a declining basin, where the cost of their DSVs is not reducing proportionately or offering increased productivity terms to cover this gap. Both Technip and Boskalis were able to buy assets at below economic cost to reduce this structural gap but the York led recapitalisation of Bibby still seems to significantly over value the Polaris and the Sapphire – particularly given implied DSV values with the Technip purchase of the Vard 801 (TBN: Deep Discovery).

DSVs made the UKCS viable and built the core infrastructure, but they did it in a rising price environment where the market was based on a fear of a lack of supply. One reason no new North Sea class DSVs were built between 1999 the Bibby Sapphire conversion in 2005 is because the price of oil declined in real terms but the price of a DSV increased meaningfully in real terms. A new generation of West of Shetland projects may keep the North Sea alive for a while longer but this work will be ROV led. A number of brownfield developments and maintenance work may keep certain “advantaged” fields going for years that will require a declining number of DSVs.

North Sea class DSV sales prices for DSVs are adjusting to their actual economic value it would appear not just reflecting a short-term market aberration.

#structural_change #this_time_it_is_different #supplymustequaldemand

My favourite scandal…

The quote above comes from the excellent Billion Dollar Whale. The culmination of some excellent investigative reporting that broke the original 1MBD scandal story in the WSJ and then later published in the book… [I am sure most people are aware but if you are not in one of the great ironies of the scandal the stolen funds were invested in The Wolf of Wall Street].

1MBD has everything: the sheer scale of the graft ($5bn), the arrogance and incompetence, the Saudis, the purchase of a yacht beyond luxury (cost $250m), a Times Square apartment, the entrenchment of the local elite and then a grovelling apology,  and the Malaysian election with Mahathir Mohamad coming from behind to win… And then it get’s interestingJust one of many outrageous uses of the money:

Nearly US$30 million (S$41.5 million) of funds stolen from scandal-hit 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) was used to buy jewellery for the prime minister’s wife, including a rare 22-carat pink diamond set in a necklace, according to latest filings by the United States Justice Department in a civil lawsuit.

And yet the 1MBD scandal just keeps on giving… and now it is getting serious because the US Dept of Justice clearly has Goldman Sachs & Co in its sights (the “unamed bank”. Goldman made $600m from selling three bond issues worth $6.5bn for 1MBD, fee rates that could be considered egregious … Ex-head of Goldman Asia, the colorful Tim Leissner, boasted of a PhD from The Univeristy of Somerset (where they could be purchased via mail for ~£2500) , as the FT acerbically noted “[w]hile an institution of that precise name does not appear to exist, one called Somerset University was fined in the UK in 1992 for selling unrecognised degrees” … Leissner appears to be co-operating… a current MD of Goldman is on leave and the current CEO was on the committee that approved the deals at the time.

Tim Liessner PHD.jpg

There are going to be documents galore here. Funds moved via US correspondent banks are subject to wire fraud regulations, a federal crime that brings the almost unlimited resources of the Department of Justice and the FBI, and encompasses communications made via email, phones etc in addition to just moving the funds. Once you are in that embrace it is very hard to leave and it seems certain now that there is a lot more to come…

Quite how much money the people of Malaysia get back remains to be seen.

A f&*^up of immense proportions….

You know it takes a lot of gumption to put this statement out…:

We are ahead of our plan to become a premier, fully integrated, global EPCI provider, with product solutions spanning on-shore and off-shore from concept to commissioning

When you have just written off ~$750m, burned through operating cash of $221m in the quarter,  have had to undertake a capital raise (~$300m in private redeemable share placement and increase working capital facilities), and sell businesses with $1.5bn in revenue… McDermott shares at the time of pixel are down around 45% to $7.

Which part of the plan was that?

The MDR and CBI merger was always about stopping someone buying them. Instead, as was obvious at the time, they have ended up with a bunch of on-shore, low- margin, construction contracts, which management didn’t know enough about to due diligence properly. There is no return from here. McDermott will never have enough capital now to compete as a new entrant to transition into deepwater as a tier 1 player, and never have sufficient skill to bid the CBI business properly. You can start to write their obituary now. In time the offshore business could well be sold to Subsea 7 for a fraction what they gave it  away to the CB&I shareholders for.

Deepwater to fund shale and renewables…

From a great article in the $FT today:

For the Anglo-Dutch major, drilling far beneath oceans is essential for raising the funds for investments that will steer it through an uncertain energy transition.

“The responsibility deepwater has is to generate the cash that is going to pay for shales and for renewables,” said Wael Sawan, Shell’s head of deepwater exploration and production. “From 2020 we start to pay the bills for the organisation,” added Mr Sawan…

The company is banking on this new profit centre — alongside conventional fossil fuels, integrated gas and its refining arm — to cover the dividend, finance debt and pay for the investments that will future-proof Shell.

Likely to have made some shareholders in companies like Seadrill (shares down 23% in the last month) and Tidewater (shares down 27% in a fortnight) choke on their cornflakes this morning…,

The never appearing subsea CapEx boom…

The graph above highlights why comments about the impending offshore capex boom, long prophesied as a certainty by true believers, maybe a long time coming… What the graph shows effectively is that the Energy Select Sector ETF (a proxy for all S&P 500 E&P companies) has significantly underperformed in percentage terms the price increase in WTI (oil) throughout 2018. Not only that the rebased price volatility of oil is high.

E&P shareholders have been saying loudly they want money back from E&P companies not a capex driven option on a future supply shortage. The easiest way for E&P companies to give shareholders comfort at this point, and hopefully boost the share price, is to reduce their forward commitments to long-lived expensive projects (deepwater) and focus on shorter payback projects (shale) to supply volume. From the $FT:

Investors have been pushing executives to cut costs, reign in investments in the type of oil megaprojects that might take decades to pay back, and focus on generating cash, either for dividends or share buybacks. Bernstein Research said this week that companies were responding, noting that those who had raised capital expenditure in the second quarter had been taught a lesson.

“Investors punished E&Ps that raised guidance by 230 basis points on average,” said Bob Brackett at Bernstein.

You read comments all the time about how it is a “certainty” that high oil prices and reserve rundown must, as if some metaphysical law, lead to increased offshore activity. It simply isn’t true. The shareholders don’t want it for a whole host of good reasons: the energy transition, the benefits of higher prices and reduced supply, price volatility when making long commitments etc. This week Equinor reduced CapEx forecasts $1bn for 2019 (from $11bn to $10bn), Total confirmed theirs at the lower limit, and Conoco Phillips did the same. All the E&P companies are making similar noises. You can come up with some really complex reasons for this or just accept the CEO’s are being consistent externally and internally: they are rationing capex reasoning the upside of doing so is better than the downside.

There has been change in perceptions and market sentiment since the last energy rebound in 2008/09:


If E&P companies are not going to get share price appreciation through sentiment they will have to do it the old fashioned way through dividends and share buy-backs; and cutting back CapEx is the single most important lever they control to do this.

Yes subsea project approvals are increasing (from WoodMac <50m boe):

WM Subsea FID.png

But in order for there to a “boom”, one that would influence day rates and utilisation levels across the offshore and subsea asset base, marginal operators have to be able, and willing, to spend and that simply isn’t the case. There is a flight to larger projects, with larger operators, who are ruthless about driving down price. So yes, spend levels are increasing, but check out the size of the absolute decline from the North Sea (from the $FT):

Investments in new North Sea projects have hit £3bn in 2018, the highest level since 2015, after two oil and gas projects received regulatory approval from authorities on Monday…

Capital investments in new North Sea fields were less than £500m in both 2016 and 2017, down from £4.6bn in 2015, but were much higher before the downturn, reaching as much as £17bn in 2011.

£17bn to to less than £500m!!! Seriously… just complete a structural change in the market and the supply chain needs to reduce massively in size and capacity to reflect a drop like that. And a recovery at £3bn is still less than 20% of the 2011 which the fleet delivered (and 30% down on 2015): volumes might be up but the drop in value is just too extreme for anything other than the major players to hold out here. It goes without saying a vastly larger number of businesses are viable with £17bn flowing through the market than £500m. The North Sea might be an extreme example by global levels but it’s illustrative of a worldwide trend.

E&P companies are spending increasing sums on shorter-cycle, potentially lower margin, projects because of the flexibility it offers in uncertain times. Subsea and offshore expenditure and volumes will be up in 2019 but not at the levels to keep some of the more speculative ventures alive.