“An uptick of 30% from the abnormally low levels in 2017 might seem encouraging, but E&P players are currently facing a low reserve replacement ratio, on average of less than 10%. This is worrisome considering the impact on global oil supply in long term,” says Espen Erlingsen, Head of Upstream Research at Rystad Energy.
I think this is simply a badly worded comment from Rystad where they mean E&P added less than 10% to overall reserves from conventional sources. In a relative sense I think Rystad are arguing that reserve replacement has been low (i.e. relative to total reserves). The comment is hard to square with the graphic at the top from the EIA and this comment which makes clear in an absolute sense there is no problem:
In 2017, a group of the world’s largest publicly traded oil and natural gas producers added more hydrocarbons to their resource base than in any year since 2013, according to the annual reports of 83 exploration and production companies. Collectively, these companies added a net 8.2 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BOE) to their proved reserves during 2017, which totaled 277 billion BOE at the end of the year. Exploration and development (E&D) spending in 2017 increased 11% from 2016 levels but remained 47% lower than 2013 levels.
Of the 83 companies, 18 held more than 80% of the 277 billion BOE in proved reserves at the end of 2017. [Emphasis added].
Rystad seem to be measuring “conventional” resources only which in this world strikes me as an irrelevant metric. Shale and Conventional may not be perfect substitutes (some refineries for instance cannot process light crude in the short-run) but they are close. Either way we don’t appear to be facing an imminent supply shortage caused by under-investment in early stage E&P activity. And in fact the EIA says:
First-quarter 2018 capital expenditures for this set of companies were 16% higher than in first-quarter 2017, suggesting that many of these companies have increased their E&D budgets, which will likely contribute to further organic proved reserves additions in 2018.
Clearly they are measuring two different things, but I still don’t get the Rystad conclusion? The EIA uses proven and economically achievable reserves on net discoveries and is surely a more relevant metric? Of course it doesn’t support a “Preparing for the Recovery” thesis at all.
If you want a graphic illustration why European offshore companies have been the most exposed to the downturn in offshore CapEx look at the first chart:
On a rolling three year average investment in Europe, which is predominantly offshore, has dropped to around 30% of previous levels. A far greater proportion than any other region and the reason is obviously that it is a high cost area of marginal production.
You can really see the productivity improvement in the second graph: Capex peaked at over $30 per BOE in 2014 and is heading down for $15 per BOE. The supply chain having gone long on fixed assets hoping to profit from a production boom has just over capitalised and allowed the E&P companies to massively reduce development spend in a downturn.
What the EIA and the Rystad combined show is the profound changes taking place in the production of oil and gas. The data show (partially and indirectly) the marginal investment curves for shale versus offshore/onshore conventional. Rystad show that conventional oil and gas replacement is dropping as a proportion of the energy mix. The EIA data shows the drop in marginal production areas: the huge drop in European CapEx, almost exclusively offshore and extremely expensive on a per BOE equivalent, shows that at the marginal capital is being redeployed in other production techniques.
But what the data emphatically does not show is anything to worry about long-term from a supply perspective.