There is a cheeky 879 page document that outlines the Seadrill restructuring, agreed this week, if anyone is interested. My only real point of interest is that the business plan that was agreed finally in December 17 contained a significant reduction in day rates and forecast utilisation levels from the previously agreed plan of June 2017.
It seems to sum up something I have said here before that the general consensus said 2017 would be better than 20 16, and actually as the numbers come in it was not, and therefore 2018 will be another year with only weak growth for offshore. The longer this keeps up the harder it gets to mark the drop in demand in the offshore industry as a purely cyclical change that will reverse. The longer the rigs and jackups keep quiet the longer the boats will be under-utilised as well. Part of this I think is the realisation that the industry has relied in the past on very high levels of utilisation to remain profitable: fixed costs are so high that profit often wasn’t reached on any unit until it has worked 270-300+ days a year, so a future where these levels might not be reached permanently again is almost too much for many banks to accept or even contemplate.
A quick look at the forecast P&L for Seadrill shows that this is a business that requires a rapid recovery for this complex restructuring to work:
In 2019 Seadrill needs to grow revenue 65% to lose $415m of cash after turning over $2bn. In 2020 Seadrill then needs to grow 40% again, and only then do they generate $25m after meeting all their obligations. A rounding error. A few thousand short on day rates or a few percentage points in utilisation adrift and they will lose some real money. Sure they start with a big cash pile, but they are still paying off .5 billion debt per annum and it goes up quickly. You don’t need to be a financial wizard to see that there is very little margin for error here. But the real dynamic here is the banks who would have to look at writing off billions if a plan along these lines cannot be agreed. And this is exactly the dynamic that drove the SolstadFarstad restructuring.
Here is a graphic example of “extend and pretend” or “delay and pray” that the Seadrill restructuring has come up with:
The banks are hoping that a collection of 32 assets, many in lay-up, will recover in economic value enough to keep them whole in the next six years. I guess if you are in for this much it is a risk you have to take but is it really realistic?
[t]he offshore Baker Hughes rig count managed a tentative rise to 215 in January from a record low of 209 in September – barely reflecting the beginning of what many expect to be a more broad-based recovery in oil and gas project development in 2018 and 2019. Our data show that after showing signs of recovery in Q1–Q2 2017, rig demand actually decreased in the second half of the year (–3 percent for jack-ups, –13 percent for floaters since July 2017). Demand has now stabilized, although it remains more than 30 percent below levels seen in mid-2014. In the next bid round, we anticipate some improvement in rates as a result. [Emphasis added].
It doesn’t feel like a deep recovery that will lead to increased day rates. Certainly not on the scale that would lead to huge increases in day rates and utilisation. Borr Drilling recently used this data point:
Tender volumes might be rising… but surely if the price goes up some tenders will be withdrawn because the work will come in above budget? The longer oil stays rangebound at $70 surely the less likely, and longer, and these high utilisation and day rate scenarios become? Borr also have a whole presentation that essentially argues for a degree of mean reversion in day rates which is really just an argument that this is a cyclical downturn. For large portfolio investors Borr might make a sensible hedge in case it is true, but I don’t think it reflects the profound nature of the change going on in the industry at the moment.
The second Borr chart simply ignores the fact that in every other upturn mentioned shale was a non-existent market force, not the marginal producer of choice it is now. And look at the most recent 2011 recovery cycle: a very shallow recovery, and the fleet increased significantly since then. But the Borr presentation does highlight the scale of the upside if this is purely a cyclical downturn. My doubts are well known here.
The other unresolved issue in the restructuring is the fate of Seadrill/ Sapura JV flexlay vessels. In Europe everyone concentrates on the DOF/Technip and Subsea 7 vessels but the Sapura/Seadrill JV also own six PLSVs operating on long term contract. The huge drop in Brazilian floater and jack-up work directly imperils the long term demand for all the PLSVs in Brazil, and it is impossible to see Petrobras renewing such long-term and rich contracts for all these vessels.
Seadrill is going to be a very public bellwether of what an industry recovery looks like in the rig market and whether this is a cyclical or structural change in industry demand. The restructured Seadrill will have to hit the run rate very quickly this year or it will rapidly become apparent that, not for the first time in this downturn, projections of a broad industry recovery have been far too optimistic.