The best of men cannot suspend their fate: The good die early and the bad die late.
DANIEL DEFOE, Character of the late Dr. S. Annesley
Boa Offshore and Volstad Maritime are both involved in restructuring talks at the moment, both are bound by the same ties of market fate and financial commitments: excessive leverage, financial speculation, and a secular change in demand for the asset base that underpinned the bonds. On a wider scale these should be seen as examples of small Norwegian companies that rode an oil and credit wave that has now definitely ended and their place in the market will remain limited at best and in the Boa case is likely to be non-existent.
The excessive leverage isn’t simply a case of hindsight: again like the Bibby bonds these were depreciating assets backed by bonds that required no repayment during the life of the instrument. Capital assets that do not have to earn a return on their principal but rather rely on further refinancing are simply speculation by both parties to the transaction and are clearly indicative of a credit bubble. Such investments are what Minsky called Ponzi financing, it requires a suspension of belief from economic reality that such a situation can continue, and that interest payments can be met by constantly drawing on an increased capital value. In the offshore oil services world this wasn’t willfully disregardng the evidence but rather the industry belief that ever rising oil prices and demand side factors were immutable forces of nature. The failure to recognise that in the long-run this would cause some innovative firms to seek new solutions is one of the great enduring mental models that has led previous generations to believe fervently in ‘peak oil’.
The other similarity is the type of vessels both Boa and Volstad have backed: no other asset class in offshore has been as overbuilt as the large OCV (~250t crane, 1000m2+ back deck etc). Potential new investors in Volstad should look at how illiquid the Boa Deep C and Boa Sub C are: bondholders are looking at a liquidity issue because these assets are in all reality unsellable at any price at the moment. When the Volstad vessel charters finish their maximum upside is surely capped to the amount bondholders in comparable assets are willing to accept to supply vessels to Helix-Canyon… and that is surely lower than their current charters? And that would assume Helix need as many vessels, a bold asumption looking at their utilisation record. In the old offshore such assets were rare and expensive… now not so much…
Part of the clue to the lack of sales in the OSV market is not just in the demand side of the market it also lies in the behaviour of banks. Have a look at DVB (my previous thoughts on the bank here), lending to offshore was running at c. USD 2-3bn per annum in 2010 to 2014:
Welcome to the world of The New Offshore and closed loan books as the DVB investor presentation (2017) shows:
That isn’t DVB specific this is a relfection of all banks in the market and a total withdrawal of asset financing. No matter what the relationship bankers tell you to all but the most exceptional cases the loan book is closed for offshore assets in all banks (apart from US focused companies with a US revenue base and a US bank). And no one pays close to historical value for such specialised assets if you cannot get a loan, but this has become a self-referential cycle that will be very hard to break, and in reality will only be done so as part of an overall consolidation play by a player with a realistic financing structure relative to the market risk.
Volstad Maritime may have a viable business going forward (i.e. strategy and execution capability) based solely on the Helix-Canyon charters, but liquidity is a different issue. The fate of the Bibby Topaz remains a major area of interest as the vessel is part of a three boat high-yeild bond and the owners of the bond have in effect an option to take full control of the Topaz. The bond has a corporate guarantee from Volstad Maritime AS that adds to the complications. OTC bonds are a grey area but rumours abound of Alchemy (the core M2 investor), other funds, and industrial players all having positions in the bond. Bibby Offshore may well be delaying their restructuring announcement until the position of Volstad Maritime and the Topaz is clear (although if they can make it to September without legally overtrading handing back an Olympic vessel is also likely an announcement time). A seperation of the Helix chartered vessels could be a viable option but only if the corporate Volstad corporate guarantee can be squared with the bond owners (who also own the m/v Tau on charter to DeepOcean but must surely been seen as effectively worthless, and the Geco Bluefin (in lay-up?)).
The Boa bondholders and banks seem to be repeating the same mistake the Harkand/Nor bondholders have consistently made: confusing a permanent impairment in asset values for a temporary market dislocation. In fact the Boa OCV bond term sheet contains the following nugget:
the aggregate current market value of the vessels according to information provided by the Group prior to the date of this Term Sheet is NOK 810,000,000
No sane individual believes that you could get USD 95.7m for the Boa Deep C and Boa Sub C at the moment: 2 vessels that have to enter lay-up because there is no work for them and assets that no bank that would lend against. There is a nice gap in the documentation here where the advisers to Boa state they have not undertaken due diligence of any information supplied. Everyone here wants to believe something everyone knows not to be true.
The structure calls for the seperation of the various asset classes into their individual vessel type exposures and is in effect a wait-and-pray strategy. Bondholders pay a “Newco” management company a fee to manage the vessels and provision is made for a further liquidity issue. I sound like a broken record here but the longer everyone keeps providing further liquidity the further any supplyside recovery becomes. The Sub C and Deep C are very nice vessels but two vessels does not an operator make in the current market, all this set-up does is support latent capacity, like the North Sea PSV market, that keeps everyone bidding at OpEx levels only. Hope is not a strategy.
I don’t have any magic answers here beyond investors accepting the economic reality of their position which they are under no obligation to do. The Boa bondholders, like the Harkand bondholders, and others, figure they have lost so much what harm can one last roll of the dice do I suspect? For those of you who have seen the movie ‘A Beautiful Mind’ you may recognise this as a problem that is a case of Nash Equilibrium:
a solution to a non-cooperative game where players, knowing the playing strategies of their opponents, have no incentive to change their strategy
It drove Nash to a nervous breakdown (literally) and I have no intention therefore of taking this any further.
The New Offshore: Liquidity, Strategy, Execution. Nothing else matters.