The Company projects that, even with the current depressed operating levels, cash generated from operations together with cash on hand should be sufficient to fund its operations and commitments at least through the end of its current guidance period ending December 31, 2018. However, the Company does not currently expect to have sufficient liquidity to repay its three tranches of funded unsecured debt outstanding that mature in fiscal years 2019, 2020 and 2021, respectively, as they come due, absent a refinancing or restructuring of such debt.
That is on the back of poor numbers from DOF yesterday, in which a restructuring/refinancing of DOF Subsea is clearly an issue, and yet another month of no work for the Nor vessels, to pick just a couple of examples… I could go on. I know Europeans like to look down on the American fleets, and technically they are clearly not as good as the European tonnage, but by virtue of market size they represent a bellweather of the industry, and the fact is it is across the board. I still feel Aker/ DSS caught a falling knife in supply rather than using capital to solve a structural issue. The price at which Hornbeck (and Tidewater) solve their financing will be interesting. Quite why Solstad didn’t leave these scale companies to sort out supply and stick to OSV/CSVs, where you can hopefully build some value into service delivery and therefore boost Enterprise Value, is beyond me.
Is there a bull case? Am I being too negative? I came across this graph from Surplus Energy Economics (a great blog I have just discovered and while I don’t agree with everything it’s very well written), from this article:
Average Annual Oil Price (constant 2015 dollars)
It’s all the bulls in offshore have got left. The arugument is that this is a temporary dislocation in demand for offshore energy and maintenance services and that shale will hit the limits of its production and energy prices will return to their long-term averages and we can all go back to beer and skittles and the demand/supply imbalance will disappear.
The problem with trends is getting caught in the middle of a bad period. I am a believer in offshore energy long-term, I just worry about the running costs of the vessels to get there, and there is a real risk of moving too early in these assets given the high carry cost. In some options time is your friend, not in OSV/CSVs… The potential equity “funding gap”, between when the red line causes day rates and utilisation to increase, is the key question facing the industry and investors.
If you brought an OSV in 1994 and sold it in 2001 it wasn’t a great investment generally. 1985 to 1999 was generally a poor time to be in oil services as an investor. Alternatively, you could be like Bibby Offshore and by a North Sea class DSV for USD 10m in 2003, just before a boom in day rates, and make extremely high risk weighted returns. The core issue (as always) is when demand comes back to signficantly increase utilisation and day rates. The offshore industry is going into this downturn with a number of vessels beyond comprehension in any previous decline and with a new competitor at the margin in shale.
Financial return depends on the the numerator (cash flow) and the denominator (discount rate) when assessing returns (CF/DR). Its not enough that day rates bounce back its the money injected in the interim. A really clever financial model could be made showing the equity gap for offshore vessel operators between now and a market recovery, but it depends on the gradient of the red slope as much as the current running cost. But as no one knows when demand will come back its not just the numerator that is important its the denominator to reflect the risk of this happening. Discounting is a brutal game, invest a dollar now with no payback, at only a 15% return (and frankly I would want more for buying such expensive options), and you calculating on only a .65 return in the dollar in three years to break even, on depreciating assets in an oversupplied market that is a bold call. A 30% IRR (common to alternative investors) is equivalent to a .45 return on the dollar in three years. A discount hurdle in day rates that just seems extremely unlikely to be met given the oversupply.
One of the areas I disagree with Surplus Energy is the view that shale cannot reduce the absolute cost of production. As I have written before shale demonstrably has. Anyone who bets against the ingenuity of US engineers to drive down economies of scale and scope, and find capital market support to do it, is making a very big call, and not one backed by many examples. Small shale wells appear susceptible to standardisation that will push the cost curve down again. I don’t see Moore’s law kicking in but the fact is the shale industry is relatively immature and suffered huge bottlenecks in the last boom. Yes, shale is using the best acreage at the moment, so productivity numbers are boosted, but the supply chain is in its infancy in terms of driving down unit costs. However, whether enough acreage can be brought on quickly enough is the defining question.
I am a long-term believer in offshore. Deepwater projects by there nature are one-off projects that are hard to standardize. They require huge investments in project specific engineering and fabrication (i.e. a much higher CAPEX) but they can offer much higher, and more consistent, flow rates (i.e. substantially lower OPEX/unit) and therefore they will be part of the energy mix going forward. These sorts of projects offer huge scope for contractors to add value and therefore earn above average rates of return. Infield projects are going to be far more challenging: launch it at the wrong time and your entire 5-7 year operational period could be one of low prices. That will significantly raise the hurdle rate for these projects.
[Headline is from the Great Man].